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Resumen de la tesis 
 
Esta tesis, titulada “La Economía de la Financiación para el Cambio Climático”, 
consiste en un compendio de contribuciones, y está estructurada en cinco capítulos. 
Después del capítulo introductorio hay tres capítulos basados en las publicaciones 
resultantes del doctorado. Un capítulo final recoge las conclusiones generales. 
El Capítulo 1 contiene los antecedentes, hipótesis y objetivos de la tesis, junto 
con un resumen de la metodología y los datos utilizados. En la sección de antecedentes 
(1.1) se detalla el contexto de la presente tesis, esto es, los retos de financiación que 
supone el cambio climático al conjunto de los países del mundo, y los compromisos 
actuales bajo la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático 
(CMNUCC). Se presentan las cinco ramas de la literatura relevantes para esta tesis: 1) 
la literatura sobre financiación para el cambio climático, que emergió con la vocación 
de apoyar la toma de decisiones sobre este tema de vital importancia para coordinar la 
acción climática global; 2) la literatura sobre “economía verde”, que aboga por la 
compatibilidad entre el buen funcionamiento de la economía y la protección del medio 
ambiente, y que aporta evidencias de las sinergias existentes entre estos dos objetivos; 
3) la literatura sobre comercio internacional y cadenas de suministro globales, que 
estudia las redes de producción plurinacionales; 4) la literatura sobre ayuda ligada, una 
parte de la literatura sobre ayuda externa conectada con el comercio internacional; y 5) 
la literatura sobre el uso de requerimientos de contenido local, herramienta de desarrollo 
industrial también utilizada para el “desarrollo verde”. Con una figura se ilustra la 
ubicación de esta tesis en la intersección de dichas ramas de la literatura, rellenando 
varias lagunas de conocimiento.  
La siguiente sección (1.2) agrupa el conjunto de hipótesis que constituye el 
punto de partida de esta tesis, el objetivo general y las siete preguntas que guían el 
trabajo de investigación hacia dicho objetivo. Las tres primeras preguntas se abordan en 
el Capítulo 2, las siguientes dos en el Capítulo 3 y las dos últimas en el Capítulo 4. Esta 
sección también indica la utilidad de nuestros hallazgos para procesos de toma de 
decisiones.  
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La siguiente sección (1.3) comienza justificando la elección del enfoque de 
modelización utilizado: un modelo input-output de demanda dentro de un marco 
multiregional y global. Se explican las ventajas de este método en comparación con otra 
herramienta de evaluación de impacto (los modelos de equilibrio general computables). 
Luego se dan más detalles metodológicos y se especifican los requerimientos de datos 
para la aplicación del modelo. En concreto, se necesitan dos conjuntos de datos: la base 
de datos input-output y la información relativa a las acciones climáticas financiadas.  
El Capítulo 2 se titula “Comercio internacional y la distribución de los 
beneficios de la financiación para el cambio climático”. Éste se basa en una 
contribución publicada como documento de trabajo por el Centro Vasco para el Cambio 
Climático (BC3, por sus siglas en inglés), y que ha sido enviada a la revista científica 
Climate and Development. Dicho capítulo se estructura en seis secciones: introducción, 
métodos y materiales, resultados, discusión, observaciones finales y apéndice.  
La introducción (sección 2.1) explica que en 2009 los países desarrollados se 
comprometieron bajo la CMNUCC a movilizar al menos 100 mil millones de dólares 
americanos para apoyar los esfuerzos de los países en desarrollo en materia de cambio 
climático. Desde entonces, varios investigadores han hecho el seguimiento de la 
evolución de los flujos de financiamiento para el cambio climático de Norte a Sur, 
detectando un persistente desequilibrio a favor de proyectos de mitigación en ciertos 
países asiáticos. En este contexto, el objetivo de esta contribución es aportar nuevos 
conocimientos sobre los impactos económicos de la financiación para el cambio 
climático a nivel global, contestando tres preguntas concretas: ¿cómo se distribuye 
geográficamente el impacto económico de la financiación para el cambio climático? 
¿Cuánto permanece en la economía del país receptor y cuánto se desborda hacia otros 
países? Y, ¿cuánto vuelve a los países donantes? 
La sección sobre métodos y materiales (2.2) explica cómo los desembolsos de 
financiación para el cambio climático se transforman en valor añadido que puede ser 
rastreado a través de sectores y países mediante un marco input-output multiregional 
global. Este enfoque metodológico permite observar el impacto económico de los 
desembolsos de financiación para el cambio climático que se produce más allá de las 
fronteras nacionales, lo que se conoce como los efectos derrame. A continuación, se 
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explica cómo se hace el cálculo del valor añadido creado por cada país para satisfacer la 
demanda generada por el desembolso de financiación para el cambio climático. Tras 
advertir sobre las limitaciones de este método, se indican los datos utilizados para el 
análisis. En concreto, se utilizan los datos del año 2011 de la base de datos WIOD 
(World Input-Output Database) para cinco países receptores y cuatro grupos de países 
donantes. También se utilizan diversas fuentes de información para la caracterización de 
26 tipos de acciones climáticas como shocks de demanda.  
La sección de resultados (2.3) está subdividida en tres subsecciones (una para 
cada pregunta de investigación). En ella se muestra, en primer lugar, el impacto local de 
los desembolsos de financiación para el cambio climático en país receptor, así como los 
efectos derrame sobre cada grupo de donantes. En segundo lugar, se distingue el 
impacto local y los efectos derrame en función del tipo de intervención climática. Por 
último se indican los efectos derrame para cada donante según tipo de intervención y 
país receptor. Dichos resultados ponen de relieve cómo la distribución del impacto 
económico varía dependiendo de a qué se destina el financiamiento. 
En la discusión (2.4) se destaca la consistencia entre el interés económico de 
los donantes (en cuanto a los efectos derrame estimados) y el sesgo observado en la 
financiación hacia proyectos de mitigación. Asimismo, el interés económico de los 
países receptores (en cuanto al impacto local estimado) resulta coherente con su 
demanda de más financiación para adaptación. Si bien no se demuestra ninguna relación 
de causalidad, los resultados sugieren que el impacto económico puede ser un factor a 
considerar en las decisiones sobre desembolso de financiación para el cambio climático. 
Tras mencionar varias ideas de investigación futuras inspiradas en estos 
hallazgos, la sección 2.5 incluye algunas conclusiones, como que la posición de una 
economía en los mercados internacionales determina en qué medida ésta se beneficia 
del impacto económico derivado de la financiación para el cambio climático, y que los 
países receptores tienen margen de mejora para retener mayores proporciones del 
impacto. 
Una de las líneas de investigación abiertas por el Capítulo 2 se aborda en el 
Capítulo 3: la tarea de desentrañar la contribución de los diferentes factores que 
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explican las diferencias observadas entre los países en su capacidad de retener o 
capturar el impacto de los desembolsos de financiación para el cambio climático. Éste 
capítulo, titulado "Análisis de descomposición espacial de los beneficios económicos de 
la financiación para el cambio climático", se basa en una contribución publicada como 
documento de trabajo por el BC3 y presentada a la revista científica Economic Systems 
Research (actualmente se encuentra en la segunda ronda de revisión). Consta de cinco 
secciones: la introducción, la metodología, los resultados, debate y conclusiones, y el 
apéndice. 
La introducción (sección 3.1) revisa brevemente la literatura sobre la 
financiación para el cambio climático y ubica esta contribución como una continuación 
del Capítulo 2. También aquí se indican las preguntas de investigación específicas de 
este capítulo: ¿cuál es la contribución de cada factor a las diferencias observadas entre 
los países? Y, ¿qué industrias ofrecen el mayor potencial para aumentar el impacto 
económico de la financiación para el cambio climático? También se introducen la 
técnica utilizada para responder a estas preguntas: el análisis de descomposición 
estructural (SDA, por sus siglas en inglés), y sus aplicaciones anteriores a otros temas 
relacionados con el cambio climático. 
En la sección sobre materiales y métodos (3.2) se detalla cómo se utiliza el 
SDA para explicar las diferencias entre países definiendo un país de referencia con el 
que comparar el resto. Proponemos una descomposición en cuatro factores (intensidad 
de valor añadido, multiplicador doméstico, multiplicador extranjero y estructura de 
comercio) y detallamos los cálculos requeridos para llevarla a cabo. Los materiales son, 
en este caso, las tablas input-output multiregionales para el año 2011 de la base de datos 
WIOD de cinco países receptores y cuatro países donantes, y datos sobre los gastos 
asociados a seis tipos de intervenciones climáticas, extraídos de diferentes fuentes 
secundarias de información. Se detallan dichas fuentes y las correspondencias utilizadas 
en la preparación de los datos para su uso en el modelo. 
La sección de resultados (3.3) se divide en dos subsecciones, una para los 
resultados a nivel país y otra para los resultados a nivel sectorial. Esta sección indica 
cuáles son los países de referencia, a qué distancia de éstos se encuentra cada país y la 
contribución de cada factor a dicha distancia. Los resultados por sectores sirven para 
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identificar las principales industrias que dan lugar a los resultados agregados, que 
resultan ser diferentes en el caso de los países receptores y donantes.  
En la discusión (sección 3.4), cada país se analiza por separado, haciendo 
hincapié en sus principales fortalezas y debilidades, y se explican los resultados a la luz 
de indicadores extraídos de las tablas input-output. Esta sección concluye dando 
recomendaciones a los distintos países sobre cómo acercarse al país de referencia y 
aumentar así su cuota del impacto económico de la financiación para el cambio 
climático. 
El Capítulo 4 se titula "Efecto derrame de la financiación para el cambio 
climático: ayuda ligada y requisitos de contenido local", y está estructurado en siete 
secciones: la introducción, un resumen sobre la ayuda ligada y los requisitos de 
contenido local (LCR, por sus siglas en inglés), la sección de métodos y datos, los 
resultados, la discusión, las conclusiones y un apéndice. 
La introducción (4.1) sitúa esta contribución como una extensión del Capítulo 
2 y define el alcance y el objetivo de este capítulo, que responde a las siguientes 
preguntas: ¿cuál es el efecto de la ayuda ligada y los LCR en el efecto derrame sobre 
los países donantes? Y, ¿qué localizaciones e industrias son más sensibles a los efectos 
de estas condiciones? A continuación, se incluye una sección (4.2) que explica los 
antecedentes de las dos prácticas objeto de este estudio, resumiendo las evidencias de su 
uso en los países objeto de análisis. Para los países desarrollados considerados se 
indican las evidencias del uso de la ayuda ligada en sus contribuciones a la financiación 
para el cambio climático. De los países en desarrollo considerados se recoge el uso de 
LCR para la promoción de “tecnologías verdes”. 
La sección de métodos y datos (4.3) introduce el marco metodológico utilizado 
(el modelo input-output multiregional global) y hace referencia a algunas de sus 
aplicaciones previas a cuestiones similares. Esta sección incluye detalles sobre los datos 
utilizados para nuestra aplicación concreta, cuyo alcance se limita a un conjunto de 
países, el año 2011 y 26 tipos de medidas climáticas. A continuación, se explica el 
diseño de los escenarios cuyo análisis permite esclarecer el efecto de las condiciones 
impuestas sobre el origen de los bienes cuando la ayuda es ligada y cuando hay 
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requerimientos de contenido local. También se explica cómo se realiza la agrupación de 
las 26 acciones climáticas consideradas en cinco grupos para facilitar el análisis y la 
comunicación de los resultados. Seguidamente se incluye una descripción de las 
características distintivas de cada grupo obtenido y la sección termina con las 
limitaciones de la metodología utilizada.  
La sección de resultados (4.4) se divide en resultados a nivel país y a nivel 
sector. La primera parte demuestra cómo el efecto derrame aumenta cuando la ayuda es 
ligada, y cómo disminuye cuando hay requerimientos de contenido local. Además se 
muestra que el efecto de la ayuda ligada es mucho más importante que el de los 
requerimientos de contenido local. El impacto de estas disposiciones sobre el efecto 
derrame depende del país receptor de los fondos, del tipo de acción implementada y del 
país donante. Los resultados por sector indican las tres industrias donde el efecto 
derrame es más grande en cada escenario, analizando cada país por separado. 
En la discusión (sección 4.5), los resultados se explican a la luz de la 
información recogida por las tablas input-output multiregionales. La sección de 
conclusiones (4.6) incluye algunas implicaciones de los hallazgos obtenidos para las 
discusiones sobre la asignación de la financiación para el cambio climático, y sobre los 
canales de la misma, así como para el desarrollo de industrias verdes competitivas. 
El Capítulo 5 se divide en cinco secciones: una introducción, un resumen de los 
hallazgos, una sección sobre las implicaciones para las políticas, algunas observaciones 
finales y las futuras líneas de investigación. La introducción (sección 5.1) habla sobre la 
relevancia del estudio de los impactos económicos de la financiación para el cambio 
climático en un momento en que se espera que dichos flujos financieros vayan en 
aumento.  
A continuación (sección 5.2) se resumen los resultados de esta tesis. Éstos se 
pueden recoger en tres frases: 1) el comercio internacional redistribuye una parte del 
impacto económico de la financiación para el cambio climático fuera de los países 
receptores; 2) la relevancia de cada uno de los factores que determinan el tamaño del 
impacto económico de la financiación para el cambio climático varía con el país; 3) las 
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disposiciones sobre el uso de los fondos transferidos modifican la magnitud de la parte 
del impacto capturada por los países donantes.  
En la siguiente sección (5.3) se recogen las principales implicaciones para las 
políticas derivadas de la tesis, distinguiendo por un lado las que afectan a los países 
donantes, y por otro aquellas de interés para los países receptores. A modo de 
conclusiones incluimos en la sección 5.4 tres observaciones derivadas de nuestra 
investigación. En primer lugar, la importancia de adoptar una escala global de análisis al 
evaluar los impactos económicos de la financiación para el cambio climático. En 
segundo lugar, la utilidad de evaluaciones de impacto económico como la nuestra de 
cara a la identificación de sinergias entre economía y acción climática. Y en tercer 
lugar, el potencial de los modelos input-output multiregionales globales para sacar a la 
luz aspectos relevantes para la acción global contra el cambio climático. 
Esta tesis finaliza señalando en la sección 5.5 tres direcciones para futuros 
trabajos de investigación: 1) la ampliación del alcance geográfico del análisis mediante 
otras bases de datos que contengan más países; 2) completar el ejercicio con el cálculo 
de las emisiones netas derivadas de cada tipo de medida climática; y 3) la desagregación 
del impacto de valor añadido en sus dos componentes: rentas de la mano de obra y 
rentas del capital. 
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Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
 COP: Conference of Parties 
 CPA: Statistical classification of products by activity 
 CSP: Concentrated solar power 
 DAC: Development Assistance Committee 
 DME: Domestic multiplier effect 
 EA: East Asia  
 EGW: Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 
 EU: European Union 
 FME: Foreign multiplier effect 
 FSF: Fast Start Finance 
 GCF: Green Climate Fund  
 GDP: Gross domestic product 
 GHG: Greenhouse gas 
 GMRIO: Global Multiregional Input-Output 
 GVC: Global value chains  
 IO: Input-Output 
 IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
 LCR: Local Content Requirements 
 M&A: Mitigation and adaptation  
 n.e.c.: Not elsewhere classified 
 NACE: Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la 
Communauté européenne  
 NAPA: National Adaptation Programmes of Action 
 NAPs: National Adaptation Plans  
 NDCs: Nationally Determined Contributions 
 OBA: Other Business Activities 
 ODC: Other developed countries 
 OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 pp: Percentage points 
 ROW: Rest of the world  
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 SDA: Structural Decomposition Analysis 
 SUT: Supply and Use Tables 
 TSE: Trade structure effect 
 UK: United Kingdom 
 UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 USA: United States of America 
 USD: United States dollar  
 VAiE: Value-added intensity effect 
 WIOD: World Input-Output Database 
 WIOT: World Input-Output Tables 
 WTO: World Trade Organization 
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1.1. Background 
Climate change is one of the main threats to humankind. Societies can respond to 
climate change by decreasing the rate and magnitude of the change through the 
reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (i.e. mitigation) and by adapting to their 
impacts (IPCC, 2007). Mitigation of climate change requires important transformations 
in many different dimensions of society (energy, transportation, agriculture, forestry, 
etc.) and will require a significant volume of financial resources. For instance, the 
International Energy Agency estimates that from 2015 to 2040 the world would need to 
invest, on average, around 1.7 trillion United States Dollar (USD) per year in energy-
supply infrastructure to limit the average temperature rise above pre-industrial levels to 
no more than 2 degrees Celsius with a probability of 50% (OECD/IEA, 2015). Besides, 
efforts in adaptation to climate change will be required, since mitigation will not 
prevent climate change from happening in the next few decades. According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2001a), adaptation to climate 
change is any adjustment in ecological, social, or economic systems responding to 
actual or expected climate changes. There is a wide range of technological, behavioural 
and institutional options to adapt to climate change, many of which will entail 
substantial costs. Only in developing countries, the costs of adaptation could reach 
several hundreds of USD billion per year, according to the United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP, 2014a). Thus, climate change poses enormous financial challenges to 
the international community, especially to less developed countries, which do not have 
easy access to the required financial resources and where the impacts of climate change 
are expected to be stronger.  
In this context, there is a growing interest in the concept of climate finance. In 
the academic literature, the concept of climate finance is used to refer to climate-related 
financial flows within or between countries that are dedicated to both mitigation and 
adaptation (Glemarec, 2011; van Melle et al., 2011). According to the Standing 
Committee of Finance of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), climate finance “aims at reducing emissions, and enhancing sinks 
of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing vulnerability of, and maintaining and 
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increasing the resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate change 
impacts” (UNFCCC, 2014a) 1.  
Since 2009 climate finance is of paramount importance for global climate 
action. At the 15th Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, developed countries 
committed to jointly mobilize USD 100 billion per year in climate finance by 2020 from 
a variety of sources (public, private, bilateral and multilateral, and alternative ones) to 
address developing countries’ needs in terms of climate action. The Copenhagen Accord 
(UNFCCC, 2009) contained this commitment, which is named Long-term Finance, 
together with the promise by developed countries to provide USD 30 billion from 2010 
to 2012 as Fast Start Finance (FSF) to support immediate action on the ground (IPCC, 
2014). At the 21st COP in Paris, the Long-term Finance commitment was reaffirmed. 
The decision 1/CP.21 accompanying the Paris Agreement urges developed countries to 
increase their level of financial support, with a concrete roadmap for achieving the 
commitment made in Copenhagen (UNFCCC, 2015). This decision upholds the USD 
100 billion target from 2020 to 2025, and specifies that this collective target will then be 
reviewed upwards. 
Climate finance flows through multilateral channels – both within and outside 
of UNFCCC financing mechanisms –, but also increasingly through bilateral channels. 
Since the negotiation of the UNFCCC in 1992, the number of climate change funds has 
increased rapidly. Today, there are around 100 international public funds, including the 
Global Environment Facility, the Adaptation Fund, the Climate Investment Funds and 
the Green Climate Fund (GCF), as well as a great number of private funds. The GCF, 
whose creation was agreed in the Cancun Agreements of the 16th COP in 2010 
(UNFCCC, 2010), was conceived as the main channel for the Long-term Finance 
commitment. As for December 2016, it had mobilized USD 10.3 billion and had started 
its support activities in developing countries (GCF, 2016). 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in 
collaboration with the Climate Policy Initiative (a leading think tank on the subject), 
estimated that in 2013–2014 developed countries mobilized USD 57 billion per year on 
                                               
1 The Standing Committee of Finance is the body in charge of assisting the COP in the tasks of 
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average for climate action in developing countries (71% from public sources) (OECD 
and CPI, 2015). The Standing Committee on Finance estimates, on its last report, that 
70% of these funds went to mitigation projects, whereas only 25% went to adaptation 
purposes (the remaining share is classified as cross-cutting issues). This report also 
remarks that most of these financial resources are directed to Asia, especially to 
countries with attractive investment environments, and to mitigation measures. Latin 
American and African countries receive a smaller share of the funds, mainly for 
adaptation (UNFCCC, 2016).  
These findings confirm a pervasive thematic and geographic unbalance in the 
climate finance distribution. Previous studies had already found that both public and 
private finance were predominantly focused on mitigation, with disbursements 
concentrated in a small number of emerging economies (China, India, South Africa and 
Brazil), while adaptation finance (coming almost exclusively from public sources) 
represented a small share of the total climate finance (Buchner et al., 2015). Thus, low-
income countries in the Middle East and Africa, where adaptation needs are 
concentrated and mitigation potential is low, have problems to access climate finance 
(Boyle et al., 2014). The Standing Committee on Finance also recognizes that many 
developing countries lack the technical capacity to deal with the bureaucratic burdens 
associated with the proliferation of diverse funding channels (UNFCCC, 2016, 2014a).  
For that reason, the Board of the GCF decided to aspire to a balance of 50:50 
between mitigation and adaptation. As for October 2016, out of the USD 424.4 millions 
of disbursements approved by the GCF, more than 50% (USD 219.9 millions) were 
allocated to adaptation (UK Government and Australian Government, 2016). Also 
responding to these concerns, the Paris Agreement included the objective of scaling up 
financial resources for adaptation, reaching balance in the thematic allocation of funds, 
and designing country-driven strategies having into account the priorities and needs of 
developing countries. In a roadmap presented right before the 22nd COP in Marrakech 
2016 (ibid), developed countries recognize that adaptation is a priority for many 
developing countries and urged donors to enhance accessibility to funds (Román et al. 
2016).  
                                                                                                                                          
measurement, reporting and verification of the support provided to developing countries. 
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The mention of country-driven strategies in the Paris Agreement might be 
motivated by concerns about the effectiveness of climate finance. According to the 
IPCC, the effectiveness of climate finance would increase if developing countries had 
the capacity to cope with the diversity of channels, and to manage the available sources 
of finance in favour of their national development strategies and needs (IPCC, 2014). 
Country ownership which, as defined by the World Bank, means that “there is sufficient 
political support within a country to implement its developmental strategy, including the 
projects, programs, and policies for which external partners provide assistance”, was 
already recognized to be a condition for aid effectiveness in the 2005 Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra High-Level Forum of Aid Effectiveness (Gomez-
Echeverri, 2013).  
So, it seems that with the Paris Agreement and the last progresses made under 
the UNFCCC, donors are trying to address some of the challenges related to climate 
finance, including unbalance, accessibility and effectiveness (Román et al., 2017). This 
would not be possible without the insights provided by the prolific scientific literature 
on climate finance spurred by the Copenhagen Accord. 
Many aspects of climate finance have already been explored in the literature. 
Some researchers have focused on tracking the progress towards the quantitative goal of 
USD 100 billion per year, characterizing the landscape of climate finance (sources, 
channels, instruments, recipients and uses) and analysing climate funds (Amin, 2015; 
Buchner et al., 2015, 2014, 2013, 2011; Fridahl and Linnér, 2015; Schalatek et al., 
2015). Others have provided quantitative estimates of the volume of financial resources 
required for financing the transition to a low-carbon resilient world (UNEP, 2014a, 
2014b).  
Using theoretical models of coalition formation, other authors have analysed 
the role of financial transfers between developed and developing countries as side 
payments to encourage participation in an international agreement for climate change 
(Barrett, 2009; Barrett and Stavins, 2003; Benchekroun et al., 2011; de Zeeuw, 2015; 
Marrouch and Ray Chaudhuri, 2011). Empirical models (e.g. Computable General 
Equilibrium or Integrated Assessment Models) have also been used to estimate the 
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magnitude of North-to-South transfers that would enable such international climate 
agreement (Bowen et al., 2015; Tian and Whalley, 2010).  
Another stream of the literature deals with the assessment of alternative options 
for the mobilization of climate finance. This group includes studies that, from formal 
and non-formal approaches, analyse welfare effects and fairness implications of 
different mobilization schemes (Buchholz and Peters, 2007; Buob and Stephan, 2013; 
Grasso, 2010; Heuson et al., 2012; Hof et al., 2011; Pickering et al., 2015a; Pittel and 
Rübbelke, 2013; Rübbelke, 2011; Schenker and Stephan, 2014; Urpelainen, 2012a). 
Finally, other studies have dealt with the aforementioned issue of climate finance 
effectiveness, studying the conditions required for climate finance to be effective (Bird 
and Brown, 2010; Chaum et al., 2011; Joffe et al., 2013; Michaelowa, 2012; 
Urpelainen, 2012b; Vandeweerd et al., 2012).  
However, the economic impacts of climate finance disbursements have not 
been studied yet. On the contrary, there exists an extensive literature supporting the idea 
of a “green economy” where synergies between economic and climate objectives are 
exploited. For example, many studies have provided estimates of the “green jobs” 
creation associated with the transition to a low-carbon economy through the deployment 
of renewable energy sources. We are specially aware of studies made for Europe 
(Cameron and van der Zwaan, 2015; Lehr et al., 2012, 2008; Markaki et al., 2013; 
Markandya et al., 2016; Moreno and López, 2008; Oliveira et al., 2013; Ortega et al., 
2015; O’Sullivan et al., 2014; Ragwitz et al., 2009), but we can also mention some 
assessments of the potential employment impacts of renewable energy sources for the 
United States of America (USA) (Wei et al., 2010), China (Cai et al., 2014), Middle 
East (Van der Zwaan et al., 2013) and Morocco (Ciorba et al., 2004). This stream of the 
literature suggests that some mitigation policies, such as the promotion of low-carbon 
technologies in the energy sector, would come with an economic benefit in the form of 
additional jobs. Similarly, it could be argued that climate finance, in addition to 
enabling mitigation and adaptation, can also contribute to the achievement of economic 
goals.  
On the other hand, most of the studies on the green economy, have focused on 
the domestic impacts in a specific country or region, ignoring the trans-boundary effects 
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due to international trade flows (an exception would be Markandya et al. 2016). This is 
especially relevant in the current globalized world, where value chains are increasingly 
fragmented across countries, with each country playing a specialized role in particular 
stages in the production chain (Timmer et al., 2014). The literature on global value 
chains (GVC) has illustrated the current fragmentation of production processes with 
particular case studies (Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2011; Ando and Kimura, 2005; Dedrick et al., 
2009; Fukao et al., 2003; Hanson et al., 2005; Marin, 2010) and with more systematic 
approaches assessing the degree of vertical specialization and tracing value-added along 
the supply chain (Daudin et al., 2011; Hummels et al., 2001; Johnson and Noguera, 
2012; Koopman et al., 2014, 2012, 2010; Los et al., 2015; Nagengast and Stehrer, 2016; 
Timmer et al., 2014; Trefler and Zhu, 2010). 
These authors have contributed to the debate about the distribution of the 
benefits of globalization, by studying the consequences of this process of unbundling on 
the geographic location of production, on employment and on income distribution 
(within and between countries). In the climate change literature, the role of international 
trade and GVC has been introduced in the discussion about countries’ responsibility for 
current concentrations of atmospheric GHGs. (Barrett et al., 2013; Davis et al., 2011; 
Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Peters, 2008; Peters et al., 2012, 2011). However, the 
influence of international trade on the distribution of the economic benefits produced by 
climate finance has not been studied yet. 
Accordingly, in this thesis we will explore the links between climate finance 
and green economy from the perspective of GVC. There are two additional branches of 
the literature that are related to this doctoral thesis. Both refer to practices by national 
governments aimed at stimulating the development of domestic industries and 
enhancing their competitiveness at global level. The first one is known as “tying aid” 
and consists in using development aid as an instrument to promote exports of donors. 
The second one consists in imposing Local (or National) Content Requirements (LCR) 
to development projects in order to protect and boost the industries of recipient 
countries. Figure 1 illustrates the literature streams relevant for this thesis.  
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Figure 1. Literature streams relevant for this thesis 
 
 
LCR 
Tied aid 
Source: Own work 
In the 90s, approximately 50% of foreign aid was “tied”, meaning that donors 
imposed beneficiaries of aid the explicit obligation of spending the received funds in 
products and services fabricated in the donor country. This practice has been officially 
criticized in numerous occasions (in 1991 by the Helsinki Package of discipline for tied 
aid, in 2001 by an OECD Development Assistance Committee recommendation and in 
2005 with the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness). Several studies have analysed 
the underlying causes of this practice, assessed the benefits of untying aid and 
documented the evolution of this practice (Brakman and van Marrewijk, 1995; Clay et 
al., 2009; Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2014, 2009; Osei, 2005; Schweinberger, 1990; 
Selbervik and Nygaard, 2006). According to this literature, the proportion of tied aid 
has decreased in the last decades, but de facto tied aid is still significant. Some studies 
also suggest the prevalence of this practice on climate finance (de Sépibus, 2014; 
Whitley, 2013, 2012; Whitley et al., 2012; Whitley and Mohanty, 2013, 2012). Since 
tied aid affects international trade, this topic occupies the intersection between climate 
finance and international trade in Figure 1. We are not aware of previous studies 
assessing the effects of tied aid on the economic impacts of climate finance 
disbursements.  
On the other hand, LCR are provisions, often associated to public support 
schemes, which impose the obligation of using a certain percentage of local products. 
Although explicitly prohibited by the World Trade Organization (WTO), this is an 
extended practice aimed at maximizing the impact of foreign financing and at protecting 
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local industries. Several papers provide evidence of the use of this instrument for 
promoting green industries (Elms and Low, 2013; Johnson, 2013; Kuntze and 
Moerenhout, 2012; Mathews, 2015; Pérez, 2013). For this reason, LCR are located in 
the intersection between green economy and international trade in Figure 1. Again, so 
far this is an unexplored territory in climate finance literature. 
1.2. Hypothesis and objectives 
Our research departs from the following set of hypothesis: 
- A disbursement of climate finance constitutes an influx of financial resources 
that is spent on the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions in the 
recipient country. 
- Mitigation and adaptation actions require expenditures in a mix of goods and 
services that need to be produced. These expenditures end up as income for the 
production factors (i.e. capital and labour) involved in the production of those 
goods and services, creating a positive economic impact in the recipient country.  
- Part of this economic impact crosses the border of the recipient country, since 
some stages of the supply chain are undertaken abroad, and thus, the factors 
participating in those stages are also located in other countries.  
- The distribution of the impact between local and foreign factors depends on the 
climate actions implemented (because these determine the composition of the 
demand shock) and on the characteristics of the recipient country (including its 
interconnection with other economies). 
- The distribution of the impact is also affected by the characteristics of the rest of 
the countries (and their role within the global economy) and by the conditions 
imposed (by donors or recipients) on the origin of the supplies for climate 
actions. 
Departing from these hypotheses, the general objective of this thesis is to study 
the economic impact of climate actions enabled by climate finance disbursements at a 
global scale. This constitutes a novel topic of research that occupies the intersection 
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between the streams of literature illustrated in Figure 1. We expand the study of climate 
finance by addressing the economic impact of disbursements, putting the emphasis on 
its international dimension and the consequences of GVC.  
This general objective is addressed by answering several specific questions: 
How is the economic impact (in terms of value-added creation) of climate finance 
geographically distributed depending on the type of climate action? How much value-
added remains in the recipient country’s economy and how much spills over to other 
countries? How much value-added returns to the donor country? What is the 
contribution of each of the factors explaining the differences between countries’ share 
of the economic impact? What factors and industries offer the highest potential for 
increasing the economic impact of climate finance in each country? What is the effect of 
tied aid and LCR on the value-added captured by donor countries? What locations and 
industries are more sensitive to these practices? 
Ultimately we aim at providing new insights to inform decisions about climate 
finance allocation, informing the design of national adaptation and mitigation plans to 
exploit the potential economic co-benefits, and making visible the opportunities that 
climate finance offers for the economic development of both developed and developing 
countries, and for the development of globally competitive green industries. 
1.3. Methods and data 
The study of the economic impact of policies (and other types of external shocks, such 
as natural disasters) has a long history. Most extended modelling approaches for impact 
assessment are the Leontief (1936) Input-Output (IO) model and Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models (Rose, 2004). The first one, despite being already a classic 
approach in economic analysis, does not become outdated, and is still widely applied to 
different research topics (Dietzenbacher et al., 2013a; Han et al., 2004; Miller and Blair, 
2009).  
IO models constitute a top-down and macroeconomic based approach of 
impact assessment, which uses the information on the interdependencies between 
industries contained in IO tables to provide estimates of the impacts in all industries 
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directly or indirectly related to a specific intervention. The IO model represents one 
economy as a set of relationships between producers (industries or sectors) and 
consumers (households, government, etc.). It represents all sales and purchases in that 
economy, reflecting the interdependencies between sectors in the production. In the 
simplest version of the IO model, interdependencies between sectors are reflected 
through constant technical coefficients, implying that substitution between inputs is not 
possible, and reflecting constant returns to scale (proportional relationship between 
inputs and output). In the standard IO model demand is not determined by income, but it 
is exogenously fixed. It reflects a partial equilibrium of the economy, between supplied 
and demanded quantities, without a mechanism linking prices and quantities. Moreover, 
the model does not include input and factor supply restrictions that could impede the 
satisfaction of additional demand.  
CGE models constitute an alternative approach, which has been also 
extensively used for assessing the economic impact of policy interventions and other 
exogenous changes (Rose, 1995). Different authors have compared these two types of 
models, both theoretically and empirically. Empirical comparisons have shown that 
results are very sensitive to the choice of model (Koks et al., 2015). Theoretical 
analyses conclude that none of them is inherently superior to the other in all 
circumstances. But instead, their different characteristics make them suitable for 
different purposes. It is the responsibility of the researcher to make the correct model 
choice depending on the specific objectives and scope of each investigation (Okuyama 
and Santos, 2014; Rose, 1995; West, 1995).  
In this case, we consider that the IO approach is more adequate for our purpose 
for four reasons:  
1. We are interested in chain reactions across different sectors, and in the empirical 
relationships between different parts of the economy “as it is”, something that is 
captured by the IO model. 
2. The IO model is transparent and almost free of assumptions. 
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3. The assumptions of IO are acceptable in our case, where the focus is on the short 
term effects of climate finance disbursements, which can be considered 
relatively limited in relation to the size of the economy of donors and recipient 
countries. In the short term the linearity in the production system and the 
impossibility of substitution are acceptable because the change in the economic 
structure can be assumed to occur relatively slowly. The partial equilibrium and 
the absence of input and factor supply restrictions are acceptable for small 
interventions, which cannot be expected to put pressure on wages and prices 
(Ciorba et al., 2004; Tourkolias and Mirasgedis, 2011). 
4. Its mathematical simplicity enables a high level of disaggregation of industries 
and goods.  
On the contrary, industries in GCE models are usually more aggregated than in 
IO models due to the mathematical complexity of interrelations between them. Besides, 
CGE rely on a scarce empirical base, and its implementation requires a large number of 
assumptions for the specification of parameters and elasticities. The general equilibrium 
on the economy and the optimizing behaviour of economic actors are also very strict 
assumptions. However, they are more appropriate than IO for assessing effects on the 
medium and long term, since the price mechanism enables to represent the reaction of 
economic agents to changes.  
There are previous applications of the IO model for the quantification of the 
impact of climate-related investments (Allan et al., 2008; Caldés et al., 2009; Hienuki et 
al., 2015; Markaki et al., 2013; Neuwahl et al., 2008; Oliveira et al., 2013; Scott et al., 
2008; Tourkolias and Mirasgedis, 2011). Most of them use national IO tables, which are 
appropriate for the assessment of domestic effects of new investments, but do not 
enable to distinguish the impact in other countries (Herreras Martínez et al., 2013; 
Ziegelmann et al., 2000). These effects, also called spill-over effects, refer to economic 
impacts outside the economy where the expenditure is made, and are driven by 
international trade.  
In order to broaden the geographic scope of the assessment and capture spill-
over effects, we need to track the flow of products across industries and countries. For 
14  
 
that reason we use Global Multiregional IO (GMRIO) tables. These tables have been 
especially constructed to reflect the current interconnectivity of world’s economies. 
They reflect the participation of the different sectors and countries in the production 
process of each product. They contain information about inter-linkages between 
industries and countries, something that enables to track the effect of a demand shock 
throughout the global productive system, beyond domestic frontiers. GMRIO models 
enable to trace the value-added2 directly or indirectly needed for the production of final 
goods. This methodology to trace value-added, which is also used in Dietzenbacher et 
al. (2012) and Timmer et al. (2014), is exposed with detail in Chapter 2.  
The value-added created by climate actions in each country depends on several 
factors which can be identified using a Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA). 
When this technique is used to compare different locations at the same point in time, it 
is named spatial SDA, and some previous examples are Alcántara and Duarte (2004), de 
Nooij et al. (2003) and Hasegawa (2006). In this case, we compare all countries with a 
benchmark country, which is the one that creates more value-added for a specific type 
of climate action. The procedure of decomposition is explained in detail in Chapter 3. 
In order to study the effects of restrictions on the origin of supplies imposed 
through tied aid and LCR, we apply a comparative static method in the context of a 
GMRIO model. The specific modifications performed in each case are detailed in 
Chapter 4. A similar method has been previously used, for example, in Markandya et al. 
(2016). 
Once clarified the methodological aspects, details on the data used are exposed 
next. Two datasets are required to apply these methods: 1) the GMRIO database that 
provides the information required to build the GMRIO model; and 2) the data required 
to define the demand shocks corresponding to each climate action.  
From the various GMRIO databases available (see Tukker and Dietzenbacher, 
2013), we have chosen the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) because it is freely 
available and it is considered to be more accurate than others (Timmer et al., 2012, 
                                               
2 The value-added reflects the remuneration of primary production factors (i.e. labour and capital), and is 
a measure of the economic impact of a certain intervention. 
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2015). World Input-Output Tables (WIOT) from the WIOD cover information for 59 
products, 35 industries and 40 countries (representing more than 85% of world gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2008) for the period 1995-2011. The WIOT are based on 
public IO tables, national accounts data and international trade statistics. In addition, the 
WIOD provides data on factor inputs. This database has been previously used in the 
GVC literature (Koopman et al., 2014; Los et al., 2015; Timmer et al., 2014). 
Demand shocks are defined for the following types of climate actions: 
renewable energy technologies (biogas, biomass, solar, geothermal, hydropower, ocean 
and wind power), energy efficiency measures (in buildings, industry and transport) and 
adaptation options (in agriculture, waste, water, infrastructure, disaster risk reduction, 
social protection, capacity building and ecosystems management). The demand shock is 
defined as a cost structure, consisting on the distribution of the total costs of 
implementation of one action amongst the different industries of the economy. The cost 
structures of mitigation actions are taken from the literature (Allan et al., 2008; Lehr et 
al., 2012, 2008; Markaki et al., 2013). Detailed information at project level of National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) is used for the definition of the cost 
structures of the rest of the climate actions (UNFCCC, 2014b). Chapter 2 provides 
additional details on the construction of cost structures of mitigation and adaptation 
actions. 
After this introduction, the rest of the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 
2 we estimate the geographic distribution of economic benefits for 17 mitigation and 
nine adaptation options. We use the GMRIO framework to track both domestic as well 
as spill-over effects of climate finance disbursements. In Chapter 3 we seek to clarify 
the differences in the capability of both donor and recipient countries to capture the 
economic benefits of climate finance. With that purpose we perform a spatial SDA. We 
focus on specific climate actions, and quantify the contribution of four factors: value-
added intensity, domestic multiplier, foreign multiplier and trade structure. In Chapter 4 
we analyse the effect on the value-added captured by donor countries of tied aid and 
LCR using the GMRIO framework for a scenario analysis. Finally, Chapter 5 gathers 
the main conclusions and potential future extensions. 
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2.1. Introduction  
Financial resources are needed for both climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
Large-scale investments are required to significantly reduce emissions, notably in 
sectors that emit large quantities of GHGs. The International Energy Agency estimates 
that achieving a low-carbon energy sector will require an average of USD 1.2 trillion in 
additional investments annually up to 2050 (IEA, 2014). On the other hand, the global 
cost of adaptation is currently estimated to range between USD 70 billion and more than 
100 billion per year by 2050. However, the dispersion and heterogeneity of adaptation 
measures make cost estimates very uncertain and probably biased downwards, 
according to the Adaptation Gap Report (UNEP, 2014a). 
Most developing countries face financial constraints (public as well as private), 
and significant additional costs imposed on their development by the impacts of climate 
change. Therefore, bilateral/multilateral public and private financing are all likely to be 
important sources of funding for their mitigation and adaptation activities. Climate 
finance is a critical topic in the United Nations’ climate talks and industrialised 
countries have committed to assistance of developing countries at the Copenhagen 
Accord (UNFCCC, 2009) and the Cancun and Paris Agreements of the UNFCCC 
(UNFCCC, 2015, 2010). In these international agreements the higher-income countries 
have jointly pledged up to USD 30 billion in FSF for lower-income countries in the 
period 2010-2012 and, in terms of Long-term Finance, USD 100 billion annually from 
2020 onwards (and a larger amount, still to be determined, after 2025).  
Some governments have started to mobilize financial resources to support 
developing countries’ mitigation and adaptation actions. The commitment for the FSF 
period was reached, especially due to the contributions by Germany, Japan, Norway, the 
United Kingdom (UK) and USA (Gupta et al., 2014). However, developed countries are 
far from reaching the Long-term Finance goal of USD 100 billion per year. According 
to OECD/CPI estimates, developed countries were able to mobilize and transfer USD 
57 billion on average in 2013-2014 (OECD and CPI, 2015). This estimate does not 
include the recent initial capitalisation of the GCF, which accounts for USD 10.3 billion 
as of December 2016 (GCF, 2016). In October 2016, the five main contributors to 
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climate funds (including the GCF) were UK (USD 11,228 million), Norway (USD 
6,606 million), USA (USD 5,750 million), Germany (USD 4,203 million) and Japan 
(USD 3,208 million)3. Experts agree that climate finance must be accelerated and scaled 
up to put the world on track to attain a climate-neutral and resilient development in this 
century (Gupta et al., 2014).  
So far, mitigation projects have accumulated the largest share of climate 
finance flowing from developed to developing countries. This bias towards mitigation 
was already detected in the FSF period, when mitigation was receiving 72% of 
contributions (Nakhooda et al., 2013). According to the OECD estimates of the 2013-
2014 flows, the thematic distribution of these transfers has been 77% to mitigation, 16% 
to adaptation and 7% to cross-cutting actions (OECD and CPI, 2015). Buchner et al. 
(2015), accounting not only for internationally provided funding but also for 
domestically mobilized resources, found a strong bias towards mitigation in 2014, 
particularly towards renewable energy. Adaptation projects seem to have more 
difficulties in attracting funding than mitigation projects. Exceptions are East Asia 
(EA), the Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa where 56% of total climate finance is for 
adaptation, especially for measures in the water- and wastewater sector (ibid). 
A rapidly growing body of literature on climate finance is emerging, including 
the study of the drivers of international transfers. Authors addressing this question from 
a theoretical perspective have identified different causes for the current bias towards the 
financing of mitigation over adaptation. These causes include the “global public good” 
nature of mitigation in contrast with the local scope of adaptation, the cheap mitigation 
opportunities in developing countries, the existence of established business models and 
carbon markets, and the possibility to reduce future adaptation needs with investments 
in mitigation (Abadie et al., 2013; Pickering and Rübbelke, 2014; Pittel and Rübbelke, 
2013; Rübbelke, 2011). Empirical analysis highlight the relevance of country-specific 
factors, like their institutional, economic and political characteristics (Halimanjaya, 
2015; Pickering et al., 2015b). 
                                               
3 Accounting for the current pledges according to the web site Climate Funds Update (2016). 
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This chapter contributes to this body of literature by studying an aspect of 
climate finance that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been considered yet: the 
economic effects of expenditures driven by the financed climate actions, taking into 
account the role of international trade. Like any other type of expenditure, projects and 
programmes aimed at reducing emissions and/or enhancing climate-resilience require 
the production of goods and services, and hence, the creation of value-added in various 
economic sectors at different locations. This chapter quantifies the extent to which the 
benefits of climate action, in terms of value-added creation, are retained by recipient 
countries of climate finance or, by contrast, are captured by companies from other 
countries via international trade. Moreover, by assessing the economic effects of 
different types of climate actions in different locations, this chapter provides 
information for climate finance allocation decisions. Note that we limit the scope of the 
assessment of economic effects to the phase of disbursement of climate finance. 
Another branch of the climate finance literature deals with the economic consequences 
of the mobilization of financial resources in donor countries (Basu et al., 2011; IMF, 
2011; Jones et al., 2013; Parker et al., 2010). 
The specific objectives of this chapter can be summarized in three questions. 
First, how are the economic impacts of climate actions distributed between countries? 
Second, distinguishing for different types of mitigation and adaptation actions, how 
much of the impact spills over to non-recipient countries? And third, distinguishing for 
different disbursement options (i.e. combinations of recipient country and climate 
action), how much impact is captured by each donor country?  
The chapter is divided into five sections. After this introduction (Section 2.1), 
the methods and materials are introduced (Section 2.2). Results are presented in Section 
2.3, and discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents conclusions and policy 
implications. 
2.2. Methods and materials 
2.2.1. The Input-Output Model 
The IO approach has been widely applied to various areas over the last 50 years (Han et 
al., 2004; Miller and Blair, 2009). This approach is the most widely utilized for the 
22  
 
analysis of macro-economic implications of major new expenditures, as is the case of 
investments driven by climate policies (Allan et al., 2008; Caldés et al., 2009; Hienuki 
et al., 2015; Markaki et al., 2013; Neuwahl et al., 2008; Oliveira et al., 2013; Scott et al., 
2008; Tourkolias and Mirasgedis, 2011).  
An IO table provides a picture of the market transactions taking place between 
the different actors (producers, households, government, etc.) of one economic system 
in a specific year. National IO tables, representing the national economic system, are 
appropriate for the assessment of domestic effects of new investments, but do not 
enable to distinguish the impact in other countries (Herreras Martínez et al., 2013; 
Ziegelmann et al., 2000). These effects, also called spill-over effects, refer to economic 
impacts outside the economy where the expenditure is made, and are driven by 
international trade.  
Given the growth of vertical specialization and the increasingly global nature 
of current supply chains (Francois et al., 2015; Johnson and Noguera, 2012; Koopman 
et al., 2014, 2012; Los et al., 2015; Nagengast and Stehrer, 2016)4, GMRIO tables are a 
highly suitable tool for studies with a global scope, since they inherently reflect the 
current interconnectivity of the world’s economies. They comprise information on 
global supply chains, reflecting the participation of the different sectors and countries in 
the production process of each single good or service. The information about inter-
linkages between industries enables to comprehensively track the effect of an 
exogenous increase in demand throughout the global productive system. GMRIO tables 
enable to trace the value-added created by all the labour and capital directly or indirectly 
needed for the production of final goods along their GVC. This feature makes this 
framework suitable for the purpose of this chapter (Timmer et al., 2014). Spill-over 
effects of climate policy have been previously assessed using this framework at the 
European Union (EU) level (Arto et al., 2015; Markandya et al., 2016). 
Next, we illustrate the structure of a multiregional IO model with the example 
of a three-country model. It consists of a system of linear equations that describe the 
                                               
4 For example, Timmer et al. (2014) using the GMRIO framework show that the process of international 
production fragmentation is pervasive: between 1995 and 2008 the content of foreign value-added in 
manufactures increased in 85% of the examined goods. 
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relation between inputs and final products in each sector. In this case, the standard 
demand-driven model can be written as  
1
-x I A F LF

   
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Where rx is the column vector of gross outputs in country r with elements 
r
ix  
indicating the production in country r of products of sector i. I is an identity matrix of 
the appropriate dimension (in this case, three). A rs  is the matrix of input coefficients 
calculated as  
1
ˆrs rs s

A Z x , where 
rsZ is the matrix of intermediate inputs from 
country r to country s, with elements 
rs
ijz indicating the sales of sector i in country r to 
sector j in country s and  
-1
ˆ rx is the inverse of the diagonal matrix of the gross outputs 
vector.  
1
-

I A is also known as the matrix of production multipliers or Leontief inverse 
matrix L , where each element rsijl indicates the increase in the production of sector i in 
country r due to a unitary increase of demand of sector j in country s. f
st
 is the column 
vector with the final demand, with elements 
st
jf  indicating the final demand in country 
t for products of sector j produced by country s. This model is called demand-driven 
because for any new exogenous final demand 'F , the total output 'x can be estimated as 
' 'x LF .  
Value-added reflects the contribution of an industry to an economy (Miller and 
Blair, 2009). Using value-added coefficients it is possible to differentiate the 
contribution of each country to the value-added embodied in a certain new expenditure 
(Dietzenbacher et al., 2012). To calculate value-added coefficients we use the column 
vector of value-added in country r wr, with elements 
r
iw  indicating the value-added 
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created in each sector i of that country. With this information and the inverse of the 
diagonal matrix of the gross outputs, value-added coefficients are obtained as 
 
-1
ˆ=r r rv x w . The vector of value-added effects is calculated as ˆ ˆ' ' w vx vLF . Thus, 
the value-added created in the country r as a consequence of a demand shock in country 
t is 
'w 'v L frt r rs st
s
 
The IO method is based on the hypotheses of a linear relationship between 
inputs and production. It is also assumed that each sector produces one product, and that 
each sector has a single and constant input structure. The model ignores the possibility 
of substitution between inputs or the possibility of increasing/decreasing returns to scale 
and technical change. A change in output is supposed to produce a proportional change 
in inputs without affecting prices. These assumptions are only reasonable in the medium 
term (since the change in the economic structure can be assumed to occur relatively 
slowly), and in economies with excess capacity and involuntary unemployment, or for 
the study of relatively small interventions that will not affect prices (Ciorba et al., 2004; 
Tourkolias and Mirasgedis, 2011). These requisites are met in our case, since the focus 
is on short-term effects of expenditures that, due to their limited volume, cannot be 
expected to put pressure on wages and prices. Note that, in order to avoid arbitrary 
assumptions, we limit the analysis to the gross effects, ignoring the effect of 
expenditures potentially displaced by the climate finance disbursements. The 
assessment of net effects free of assumptions is possible using a retrospective approach 
when historical data on the actual transformations of the economy is available (as 
shown by Markandya et al., 2016). 
2.2.2. The database 
In order to apply this model we depart from two sets of data: 1) the GMRIO database, 
that provides information at industry level on production, technical coefficients, final 
demand and value-added for different countries; and 2) the data required to define the 
demand shock (
'f st ) by climate action and recipient country.  
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2.2.2.1. The GMRIO database 
From the various GMRIO databases (see Tukker and Dietzenbacher, 2013), we have 
chosen the WIOD. Two important advantages of WIOD are the following: first, it is 
public and freely available; and, second, it is based on national Supply and Use Tables 
(SUT), which contain information in terms of commodities that is required for the 
definition of the demand shocks. WIOT from the WIOD combine information on 
national production activities for 59 products and 35 industries with international trade 
data for 40 countries (27 EU countries5 and 13 other major countries) for the period 
1995-2011. The WIOD has certain weaknesses related to measurement issues6 and an 
important limitation for our analysis: the absence of least developed countries, where 
climate finance disbursements are most needed.  
The analysis focuses on the most recent data (i.e. year 2011) and on all the 
countries included in the WIOD. Brazil, China, Indonesia, India and Mexico are 
considered climate finance recipient countries, and the rest of the countries are 
considered donor countries. Donors are divided into four groups: USA, EU, EA (Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan) and other developed countries (ODC: Australia, Canada, Russia and 
Turkey). While this set does not include all countries, it represented approximately 84% 
of global GDP and 72% of global GHG emissions in 2011. The set of recipient 
countries represented around 60% of the emissions as well as GDP from developing 
countries in 2011 (World Bank Indicators).  
2.2.2.2. Demand shocks 
Demand shocks defined as 
'f st are calculated for different types of climate actions using 
different sources of information. Following previous categorizations of climate action 
measures (Blazejczak et al., 2014; Buchner et al., 2013; OECD/IEA, 2014; Prowse and 
Snilstveit, 2010; REN21, 2014, p. 21; UNFCCC, 2014b), we consider 26 climate 
actions and divide them into three groups:  
                                               
5 In the WIOD and in this thesis the UK is still considered a Member State of the European Union. 
6 For a detailed description of the WIOD project, the WIOT and their main weaknesses see Dietzenbacher 
et al. (2013b) and Timmer et al. (2012, 2015). 
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- Mitigation: This group consists of those actions with benefits in terms of GHG 
emissions reductions, including 14 renewable energy technologies (biogas 
power; biomass energy at large scale; biomass energy at small scale; 
concentrated solar power (CSP); deep geothermal energy; surface geothermal 
energy; hydropower; ocean power; offshore wind power; onshore wind power; 
photovoltaics; renewable energy in buildings; renewable energy in transport; 
solar thermal energy) and three energy efficiency measures (building insulation; 
energy efficiency in industry; transport infrastructures).  
- Adaptation: This group consists of those actions that improve the resilience of 
societies, including measures in six sectors (coastal protection; disaster risk 
reduction; human settlements, infrastructure and spatial planning; social 
protection; waste and wastewater; water supply and management).  
- Mitigation and adaptation (M&A): This group contains three actions with 
benefits in both aspects (agriculture, fishing and livestock; capacity building; 
forestry and land use, terrestrial ecosystems).  
For each climate action, a particular cost structure has to be determined. Cost 
structures consist in the distribution of the total costs of implementation of one action 
amongst the IO industries or commodities. We need cost structures defined in terms of 
the commodities classification of the SUT of WIOD (i.e. the Statistical Classification of 
Economic Activities in the European Community or NACE7). The cost structures of 
mitigation actions are taken from the literature: most renewable energy technologies 
from Lehr et al. (2012, 2008); ocean energy from Allan et al. (2008); renewable energy 
in transport and buildings and energy efficiency measures from Markaki et al. (2013). 
Detailed information at project level of NAPA (UNFCCC, 2014b) is used for the 
definition of the cost structures of the rest of the climate actions. Since each climate 
action in adaptation comprises very different types of interventions, one particular 
NAPA project has been selected for each type, as shown in Table 1. 
                                               
7 Table 5 in the Appendix (Section 2.6) displays the NACE classification of commodities. NACE stands 
for Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne. 
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Table 1. Types of adaptation projects and sources of information 
Climate action Type of intervention NAPA Project 
A
da
pt
at
io
n
 
Coastal 
protection 
Beach nourishment GAMBIA #9 
Coastal protection structures CAPE VERDE #3 
Rehabilitation of coastal areas SIERRE LEONE #18 
Disaster risk 
reduction 
Early warning or emergency response systems GAMBIA #1 
Construction or improvement of drainage systems BHUTAN #5 
Flood protection BHUTAN #7 
Hazard mapping and monitoring technologies BHUTAN #9 
Improved climate services SIERRE LEONE #2 
Water supply 
and 
management 
Rainwater harvesting and storage SUDAN #2 
Rehabilitation of water distribution networks SIERRE LEONE #12 
Desalinization, water recycling and water conservation TUVALU #3 
Human 
settlements, 
infrastructure 
and spatial 
planning 
Energy security (hydropower) TANZANIA #5 
Energy security (solar energy) SIERRE LEONE #8 
Energy security (biomass) GAMBIA #6 
Transport and road infrastructure adaptation MALDIVES #10 
Protection of infrastructure BHUTAN #6 
Zoning SAMOA #6 
Improving the resilience of existing infrastructures/buildings MALDIVES #8 
Social 
protection 
Livelihood diversification MALAWI #1 
Food storage and preservation facilities LESOTHO #8 
Health, vaccination programmes SIERRE LEONE #23 
Waste and 
wastewater 
Sanitation SIERRE LEONE #22 
Storm and wastewater MALDIVES #5 
M
it
ig
at
io
n
 &
 a
d
ap
ta
ti
on
 
Forestry and 
land use, 
Terrestrial 
Ecosystems 
Afforestation and reforestation ERITREA #3 
Ecological restoration and soil conservation LESOTHO #6 
Protection of biodiversity TUVALU #5 
Forest management, management of slopes and basins BURUNDI #3 
Forest fires reduction BHUTAN #11 
Capacity 
building 
Awareness raising and integrating into education BURUNDI #11 
Technical assistance MALAWI #5 
Planning, policy development and implementation SIERRE LEONE #19 
Agriculture, 
fishing and 
livestock 
Crop / animal diversification SIERRE LEONE #5 
Crop, grazing land, livestock and fisheries enhanced management ERITREA #2 
Research MALDIVES #9 
Irrigation and drainage system SIERRE LEONE #7 
Source: Own work 
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Table 2. Correspondence between NAPA and NACE categories 
NAPA expenditure categories 
NACE 
commodities code 
Breeding animals, forage seeds, planting, crop management 1 
Forest nurseries, re/afforestation, rehabilitation, beach stabilization, plantations 2 
Materials, reporting, communication, awareness creation, training 22 
Chemicals, drugs, raw materials 24 
Materials for construction and rehabilitation 26 
Tools 28 
Machinery and installation 29 
Office equipment  30 
Transmission and distribution network 31 
Laboratory/field/data processing equipment, hydrology/meteorology stations,  
telecommunication, remote sensing 
33 
Vehicles 34 
Construction, rehabilitation, beach stabilisation, improve facilities/infrastructure 45 
Logistics 60 
Communication (campaign, networks, workshops) 63 
Communication (telephone, internet and postal charges) 64 
Micro-credit fund 65 
Vehicle hiring charges 71 
Research, experimentation, mapping 73 
Technical support, design, management, planning, training 74 
Institutionalisation of policies, support to collaborating agencies 75 
Sanitary inspections, vector control measures, medical/veterinary services 85 
Waste collection, sanitation 90 
Source: Own work 
The cost structure of each climate action is calculated as the average of the cost 
structures of the different types of interventions it comprises. The allocation of 
expenditures contained in NAPA projects to the commodity categories of the SUT is 
done following the correspondence in Table 2. 
Figure 2 shows the obtained cost structures in terms of commodities, showing 
clearly the differences between the types of climate action envisaged. It shows, for 
example, that almost any type of project requires some construction work (commodity 
code 45), machinery (commodity code 29) and other business services (commodity 
code 74). On the contrary, only a few actions, such as introducing biofuels in transport, 
require agricultural products (commodity code 1). 
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Figure 2. Cost structure by climate action (NACE classification)8 
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Source: Lehr et al. (2012, 2008), Allan et al.(2008), Markaki et al. (2013) and UNFCCC (2014b) 
There is uncertainty regarding the cost structures defined for each climate 
action. The cost structure of renewable energy technologies depends on where and when 
the data on costs was gathered, due to differences in the costs of raw materials and 
labour, the different levels of commercial maturity of technologies, the evolution of 
global markets, etc. Adaptation projects or programmes are very heterogeneous, and the 
site-specific circumstances influence costs. The approach here proposed can be used to 
                                               
8 The description of commodity codes is detailed in Table 5 of the Appendix (Section 2.6). 
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undertake concrete case studies departing from data of particular projects, something 
that would enhance the accuracy of results. However, the ambition of this chapter is to 
extract general conclusions about the sharing of economic benefits of climate finance 
that are not evident at first glance.  
Obtained cost structures are based on cost data that include taxes and trade 
margins. Since the WIOT are expressed at basic prices (i.e. the amount actually received 
by producers), trade and transport margins and taxes need to be reallocated. WIOD 
International Supply Tables contain the information required to calculate tax and 
margins rates for each recipient country9 and commodity. The part of the expenditure 
corresponding to taxes is reallocated according to the government expenditure structure 
in each recipient country, which is calculated with information from the WIOD 
International Use Tables. The amount corresponding to trade margins (calculated with 
margins rates and the expenditure net of taxes) is reallocated according to the share of 
the total margins corresponding to each trade and transport service in each recipient 
country, which is calculated with information from the WIOD International Supply 
Tables. 
Once the cost structures are expressed at basic prices, the next step is to 
differentiate where commodities are produced. Using the WIOD International Use 
Tables, we calculate for each recipient country and each commodity the portion of the 
total demand that is domestically produced, and the portion that is imported from all the 
other countries. Finally, we allocate the demands of each commodity and country to the 
WIOT industries according to the market shares calculated with the information of the 
International Supply Tables. The resulting demand shocks (
'f st ) contain additional final 
demands, at basic prices, to different sectors (in different countries) that each climate 
action entails in each recipient country.  
2.3. Results 
Using this multiregional framework we obtain the amount of value-added generated by 
each country contributing (directly or indirectly) to the production of the goods and 
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services needed for the climate actions. In this section, the research questions listed in 
the introduction are answered. Since impacts at the sector level are not the focus of this 
research, results are aggregated at country level. 
2.3.1. Geographic distribution of the value-added impact 
The first question is how the economic impacts caused by the implementation of climate 
actions are distributed between countries. Figure 3 displays the geographic distribution 
of the value-added impact for the average of the 26 climate actions considered, 
depending on where climate finance is disbursed. For example, out of every USD 100 
spent in climate actions in India, USD 80 remain in the Indian economy, China and the 
EU capture four dollars each, the USA and ODC capture two dollars each, EA countries 
capture one dollar and the remaining seven dollars go to the rest of the world (ROW). 
Figure 3. Geographic distribution of the impact by recipient country 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), EA (East Asia), EU (European Union), 
IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX (Mexico), ODC (other developed countries), USA (United States of 
America). 
                                                                                                                                          
9 Since this information is not available for two recipient countries (China and Indonesia), average values 
of the other recipient countries (Brazil, India and Mexico) are used instead. 
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On the one hand, the figure shows the differences in the ability of the 
economies of recipient countries to hold on to the value-added: in India and Brazil 
around 80% of the benefit remains within the domestic economy, but Mexico and 
Indonesia retain no more than two thirds. China is in an intermediate position among 
recipient countries, retaining 72% of the impact of its climate actions. On average, spill-
overs account for 28.6% of the total impact.  
On the other hand, the ability of the countries to attract spill-over effects also 
varies. The EU is the region that benefits most from international spill-overs in most 
cases. It captures 9% of the impacts generated when climate actions are implemented in 
China and 7% in the cases of Brazil, Indonesia and Mexico. It is also the donor that 
captures the highest share of spill-overs from India, where these are in any case very 
low for all donors. Note that the USA captures 15% of the impacts when climate actions 
are implemented in Mexico, but less than 3% from other recipient countries. EA 
captures 6% of the impacts generated by climate actions in China and 5% in the case of 
Indonesia. In fact, EA captures more spill-overs than the USA in these two countries. 
China also substantially benefits from spill-overs independently of the destination of 
climate finance. Spill-overs attracted by China are among the largest when climate 
finance goes to India, Brazil and Indonesia. For example, China attracts more spill-
overs from India and Indonesia than the USA does, and a similar level of spill-overs 
from Brazil.  
In order to clarify how impacts generated by climate finance are distributed 
among countries, we use the following example, illustrated in Figure 4: if each of the 
four donor countries (or group of countries) transferred one dollar to a hypothetical 
GCF and this four-dollars fund was equally distributed among the five recipient 
countries, each of the donors would recover the following amounts in the form of spill-
overs: USD 0.27 for the EU, USD 0.21 for the USA, USD 0.15 for EA and USD 0.08 
for ODC. The amounts obtained by recipient countries would be USD 0.72 for China, 
USD 0.65 for India, USD 0.64 for Brazil, USD 0.53 for Indonesia and USD 0.49 for 
Mexico. 
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Figure 4. Example of financial flows from donors to recipients 
 
Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), EA (East Asia), EU (European Union), 
GCF (Green Climate Fund), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX (Mexico), ODC (other developed 
countries), USA (United States of America), ROW (rest of the world). 
Figure 5 summarises the distribution of the value-added impacts of this 
hypothetical climate finance architecture. This example clearly shows that international 
trade redirects the value-added impacts from recipient countries to the countries that 
produce the inputs required for the deployment of climate actions. 
2.3.2. Spill-overs by type of climate action 
So far, average impacts across a wide range of climate actions have been 
presented. But the geographic distribution of value-added is different for each type of 
climate action: some of them mainly produce domestic impacts, whereas others generate 
a large proportion of spill-overs. Figure 6 shows the spill-overs associated with each 
type of investment on average for the considered recipient countries. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of the impact of a hypothetical climate fund 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), EA (East Asia), EU (European Union), 
IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX (Mexico), ODC (other developed countries), USA (United States of 
America).  
For example, out of every USD 100 spent in ocean power plants, USD 45 (on 
average for our set of recipient countries) go to other countries different from the host 
country. Spill-overs range from 17% to 45%. Several actions related to renewable 
energy sources (ocean power, solar thermal power, onshore wind, geothermal surface, 
hydropower and the introduction of renewable energy in buildings) produce spill-overs 
in excess of 35%. The spill-overs from other renewable energy technologies 
(photovoltaics, small biomass, biogas and offshore wind), energy efficiency measures in 
industry, construction of infrastructures for transport and adaptation, disaster risk 
reduction actions and adaptation measures in the water sector range from 30% to 35%. 
The spill-overs from some renewable energy technologies (CSP, large biomass, deep 
geothermal and biofuels), adaptation measures (waste management and social 
protection) and M&A actions (agriculture and capacity building) range from 20% to 
30%. Finally, spill-overs of less than 20% are generated in the forestry sector, insulation 
of buildings and protection of coasts. 
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Figure 6. Average spill-overs by type of climate action 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: Agriculture (agriculture, fishing and livestock), B_insulation (building 
insulation), B_RE (renewable energy in buildings), Biogas (biogas power), Biomass_big (biomass energy 
large scale), Biomass_small (biomass energy small scale), Capacity (capacity building), Coastal (coastal 
protection), CSP (concentrated solar power), DRR (disaster risk reduction), Forest (forestry and land use/ 
terrestrial ecosystems), Geo_deep (deep geothermal energy), Geo_surface (surface geothermal power), 
Hydro (hydropower), Industry (energy efficiency in industry), Infrastr (human settlements, infrastructure 
and spatial planning), Ocean (ocean power), Social P. (social protection), Solar PV (photovoltaics), 
Solar_thermal (solar thermal energy), T_infrastr (infrastructures for transport), T_RE (renewable energy 
in transport, biofuels), Waste (waste and wastewater), Water (water supply and management), Wind_off 
(offshore wind power), Wind_on (onshore wind power). 
Table 3 presents for each type of action the portion of the impact that occurs in 
each country. Figures for recipient countries reflect the percentage of impact that each 
one holds on to from domestic climate actions. For example, out of every USD 100 
spent in capacity building projects in China, USD 78 remain in the Chinese economy. 
Figures for donor countries reflect the percentage of impact that each donor country 
attracts on average from the recipient countries considered. For example, the USA 
captures on average four dollars out of every USD 100 spent in adaptation of the 
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agriculture sector of the considered recipient countries. These figures do not add up to 
100%, since spill-overs captured by countries other than donors are not included. Recall 
that a significant share of the impact of climate actions in different recipient countries 
ends up in China.  
This table clearly illustrates that measures with larger impacts on the 
economies of recipients offer limited benefits for donor countries in terms of spill-over 
effects. Depending on the type of action, the average domestic share of the impact 
ranges from 57% to 84% (see column 6 in Table 3). Differences exist depending on the 
regions where actions are implemented. Brazil and India retain between 68% and 89% 
of the impact, while Mexico holds on to between 39% and 83%, depending on the type 
of action. 
Average figures are included for broader categories of climate action (last four 
rows in Table 3). Depending on the recipient country, the domestic share of the impact 
of M&A actions is between 76% and 86%. Other adaptation measures and energy 
efficiency actions enable countries to hold on to between 64% and 82% of the impact. 
In the case of deployment of renewable energy sources recipient countries retain only 
between 53% and 77% of the impact.  
According to our results, the climate actions with the highest impact for 
recipient countries are the following: forestry sector and capacity building actions in the 
case of M&A; coastal protection, social protection and waste management actions in the 
case of adaptation; building insulation in the case of energy efficiency; and the use of 
biofuels, deep geothermal, large biomass and CSP generation in the case of renewable 
energy. 
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Table 3. Portion of impact captured by each country by climate action10 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(percentage) IND BRA CHN IDN MEX 
AVG 
Recipient 
EU USA EA ODC 
AVG 
Donor 
Coastal (A) 86 88 80 83 82 84 4 3 2 1 2 
B_insulation (EE) 82 89 81 81 83 83 3 3 2 2 2 
Forest (M&A) 87 87 80 79 78 82 4 4 2 1 3 
Capacity (M&A) 86 87 78 78 76 81 5 4 2 1 3 
T_RE (RE) 89 84 83 77 68 80 4 4 2 1 3 
Social P (A) 84 85 73 75 74 79 6 4 2 1 3 
Agriculture (M&A) 85 84 78 76 74 79 5 4 2 1 3 
Waste (A) 81 84 77 72 72 77 6 4 3 2 4 
Geo_deep (RE) 81 83 76 67 71 76 5 4 3 2 4 
Biomass_big (RE) 80 80 74 66 63 73 6 5 4 2 4 
CSP (RE) 83 77 72 70 60 72 6 5 5 2 4 
Water (A) 75 78 73 65 62 71 8 5 3 2 5 
Infrastr (A) 80 78 70 65 60 70 8 5 4 2 5 
Wind_off (RE) 81 77 71 65 57 70 7 6 4 3 5 
T_infrastr (EE) 79 74 70 70 53 69 8 6 4 2 5 
Biogas (RE) 80 76 71 58 57 68 7 6 4 2 5 
Industry (EE) 79 76 72 60 53 68 8 6 4 2 5 
DRR (A) 78 76 67 63 55 68 8 6 4 2 5 
Biomass_small (RE) 75 77 68 56 59 67 7 5 5 3 5 
Solar_PV (RE) 73 75 65 67 55 67 6 5 5 2 5 
Hydro (RE) 80 71 68 54 44 63 9 7 5 2 6 
Wind_on (RE) 79 71 65 57 45 63 8 7 5 3 6 
Geo_surface (RE) 77 74 68 50 47 63 9 7 5 3 6 
B_RE (RE) 79 69 68 57 42 63 9 7 6 2 6 
Solar_thermal (RE) 70 73 66 54 52 63 9 6 5 3 6 
Ocean (RE) 68 68 65 44 39 57 11 8 6 3 7 
Average M&A 86 86 79 78 76 81 5 4 2 1 3 
Average A 80 81 73 70 66 75 7 5 3 2 4 
Average EE 82 81 77 72 64 73 6 5 3 2 4 
Average RE 77 75 69 59 53 68 8 6 5 2 5 
 
Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), EA (East Asia), EU (European Union), 
IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX (Mexico), ODC (other developed countries), USA (United States of 
America), AVG (average), A (adaptation), Agriculture (agriculture, fishing and livestock), B_insulation 
(building insulation), B_RE (renewable energy in buildings), Biogas (biogas power), Biomass_big 
(biomass energy large scale), Biomass_small (biomass energy small scale), Capacity (capacity building), 
Coastal (coastal protection), CSP (concentrated solar power), DRR (disaster risk reduction), Forest 
(forestry and land use/ terrestrial ecosystems), EE (energy efficiency), Geo_deep (deep geothermal 
energy), Geo_surface (surface geothermal power), Hydro (hydropower), Industry (energy efficiency in 
industry), Infrastr (human settlements, infrastructure and spatial planning), M&A (mitigation and 
adaptation), ocean (ocean power), RE (renewable energy), Social P. (social protection), Solar PV 
(photovoltaics), Solar_thermal (solar thermal energy), T_infrastr (infrastructures for transport), T_RE 
(renewable energy in transport, biofuels), Waste (waste and wastewater), Water (water supply and 
management), Wind_off (offshore wind power), Wind_on (onshore wind power).  
                                               
10 Figures for recipient countries (columns 1-5) reflect the percentage of impact that is retained by each 
country when it receives climate finance. Figures for donor countries (columns 7-10) reflect the 
percentage of impact that each donor country attracts on average when climate finance is disbursed to the 
recipient countries considered. The colour scale reflects the attractiveness of each climate action for each 
country (from the point of view of its potential for creating domestic impacts in the case of recipient 
countries, and spill-overs in the case of donors). So, the colour scale ranks values column-wise. The most 
attractive options are in darker tones and the least attractive ones in lighter tones. The table is sorted by 
the value of column 6 (Average Recipient) in descending order. 
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Depending on the type of action, the average spill-overs that accrue to donor 
countries range from 2% to 7%, with substantial differences between donors (last 
column in Table 3). Hence, depending on the donor country, renewable energy 
investments may provide spill-overs of between 2% and 8%, energy efficiency 
measures and adaptation between 2% and 7% and M&A actions between 1% and 5% 
(last four rows in Table 3). From the point of view of donor countries, the types of 
climate actions that result in a significant portion of impacts taking place in their 
economies are the following ones: ocean, wind, solar and hydropower for renewable 
energy sources; those in the industry sector and transport infrastructures for energy 
efficiency projects; actions in the water sector, infrastructures and disaster risk reduction 
measures for adaptation; and actions in the agriculture sector for M&A.  
Although there is a common pattern for all countries included on the same side 
of the climate finance transfer (i.e. recipients or donors) regarding the effects of each 
type of action, there are slight variations. For example, India experiences a larger impact 
than the average recipient country due to the introduction of biofuels and water supply 
and management investments. China also stands out because of the size of the local 
impact of biofuels and photovoltaics. The same occurs with donors. For instance the EU 
stands out because of the size of the spill-overs received from ocean power investments. 
2.3.3. Spill-overs by disbursement option 
In the previous section, spill-overs were given as average, and did not enable to 
distinguish differences caused by the location where actions are implemented. The size 
of spill-overs captured by a donor country depends not only on the type of climate 
action, but also on the recipient country where it is undertaken. Table 4 gathers the 
results relative to the portion of spill-overs that each donor country can expect from 
climate-related expenditures in the different recipient countries. This table could help to 
rank climate finance disbursement alternatives according to potential of generating 
value-added spill-overs for each donor country.  
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Table 4. Impact captured by donor country, location and climate action11 
USA EU EA ODC 
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Ocean 3 5 3 5 24 7 11 13 12 13 2 3 6 11 6 2 2 4 4 4 
Geo_surface 2 4 3 4 22 5 9 11 10 11 2 2 6 11 5 2 2 4 3 3 
B_RE 2 4 3 4 22 4 10 11 9 11 2 4 7 9 7 1 1 3 3 3 
Hydro 2 4 3 4 21 4 9 11 9 11 2 3 7 9 6 1 1 3 3 3 
Wind_on 2 5 4 4 19 4 9 11 7 10 2 3 7 9 6 2 2 4 3 4 
Solar_thermal 2 4 3 4 18 6 9 12 9 10 2 2 6 9 5 2 2 4 3 3 
Industry 2 3 3 3 19 4 9 9 8 9 2 2 5 8 5 2 1 3 3 3 
T_infrastr 2 4 3 2 21 4 10 11 5 8 2 3 5 6 7 2 1 3 2 3 
DRR 3 4 4 3 15 5 9 11 8 8 2 2 7 6 5 1 1 3 2 2 
Biomass_small 2 3 3 3 15 5 7 10 7 7 2 2 5 10 4 2 2 5 3 3 
Biogas 2 3 3 3 17 4 8 10 8 8 2 2 5 8 5 1 1 3 3 2 
Infrastr 2 3 3 3 15 4 8 10 8 8 1 2 6 6 4 2 1 3 2 2 
Wind_off 2 4 3 3 16 4 8 9 5 8 2 2 5 7 4 2 2 4 2 3 
Solar_PV 2 3 4 2 14 5 6 10 5 6 2 3 7 6 6 2 2 4 2 2 
Water 2 3 3 3 16 5 8 10 8 8 2 1 4 6 3 2 1 2 2 2 
Biomass_big 2 3 3 2 14 4 7 7 6 7 1 2 5 7 4 2 1 3 2 2 
CSP 2 3 3 2 14 3 7 8 4 6 1 3 6 6 6 1 1 3 2 2 
Waste 2 2 3 2 12 4 6 7 6 6 1 1 4 5 2 2 1 3 2 2 
Geo_deep 2 2 3 2 12 3 6 7 5 5 1 1 4 6 3 2 1 3 2 2 
Social P 2 2 4 2 11 3 6 9 5 6 1 1 4 4 2 1 1 2 2 1 
Agriculture 2 2 3 2 11 3 6 7 5 5 1 1 4 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 
Capacity 2 2 4 2 12 3 5 7 4 5 1 1 3 4 2 1 1 2 2 1 
T_RE 1 2 2 2 15 2 5 5 4 5 1 1 2 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 
Forest 2 2 3 2 10 2 4 6 4 4 1 1 3 4 2 1 1 2 2 1 
Coastal 1 2 2 1 7 3 5 5 3 3 1 1 4 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 
B_insulation 1 1 2 1 7 3 4 4 3 3 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 
Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), EA (East Asia), EU (European Union), 
IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX (Mexico), ODC (other developed countries), USA (United States of 
America), AVG (average), Agriculture (agriculture, fishing and livestock), B_insulation (insulation of 
buildings), B_RE (renewable energy in buildings), Capacity B. (capacity building), Coastal (coastal 
protection), CSP (concentrated solar power), DRR (disaster risk reduction), Forestry (forestry and land 
use/ Terrestrial Ecosystems), Geo_deep (geothermal deep), Geo_surface (geothermal surface), Hydro 
(hydropower), Infrastr (human settlements), infrastructure and spatial planning), Ocean (ocean power), 
Social P. (social protection), Solar PV (photovoltaics), T_infrastr (transport infrastructure), T_RE 
(renewable energy in transport), Waste (waste and wastewater), Water (water supply and management), 
Wind_off (offshore wind), Wind_on (onshore wind). 
                                               
11 The colour scale reflects the attractiveness of each climate action for each donor country (from the 
point of view of its potential for creating spill-overs). So, the colour scale ranks the values referred to one 
donor (including different climate actions in different locations). The most attractive options are in darker 
tones and the least attractive ones in lighter tones. 
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The USA benefits especially from climate projects in Mexico, regardless of 
their type, as it captures between 7% (coastal protection) and 24% (ocean energy) of the 
total impact in the form of spill-overs. Other investment options that offer good returns 
to the USA are ocean energy projects in Brazil and Indonesia and onshore wind projects 
in Brazil (5% each). China is the country that generates the largest spill-overs for the 
EU and ODC. The action that offers the largest spill-overs for the EU is ocean power in 
China and in Mexico (13%). Indonesia, Mexico and Brazil offer spill-overs of 7% on 
average for the EU. ODC’s best options are small biomass projects in China (5%), 
ocean power and onshore wind in Mexico (4%) and ocean power in Indonesia (4%). EA 
benefits especially from ocean energy and surface geothermal investments in Indonesia 
(11%), but also from several types of projects in China and Mexico (7%).  
Several combinations of location/type of action have a very limited potential to 
generate spill-overs for donors. Cases with average spill-overs below 2% include most 
climate actions in India, several in Brazil (social protection, renewable energy in 
transport, capacity building and forest adaptation, building insulation and coastal 
protection), and building insulation and coastal protection in Indonesia12. 
2.4. Discussion 
We have shown that the stimulus generated by climate-related expenditures is shared 
out between the recipient country and other economies, including donor countries, due 
to international trade. This fact might be taken into account by both donors and 
recipients when making decisions about climate finance allocation.  
From the point of view of a potential donor, as long as its ability to capture 
spill-overs is substantial, contributing to climate finance might be a way to stimulate 
exports and growth. Since the size of potential benefits differs from one donor to 
another, as results on spill-overs show, the influence of this factor on climate finance 
decisions might also vary.  
Even though spill-overs might currently be only receiving marginal attention 
from the donors, it is remarkable that those donors benefitting from significant spill-
                                               
12 See original contribution in Román et al. (2016a) 
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overs are also major contributors to climate funds (i.e. UK, USA, Germany and Japan). 
The great ability of China to capture spill-overs may also be somehow related to the 
prominence of China as donor in South-to-South cooperation. In fact, China does not 
hide that it sees foreign aid as a way to expand exports (Minas, 2014; The Climate 
Group, 2013).  
Our results indicate the potential of each type of action and alternative location 
for generating spill-over effects via demand for donors’ industries products. The group 
of measures that produce the largest spill-overs includes several mitigation and 
adaptation options requiring goods with high technology content that are not usually 
domestically produced in many recipient countries, such as machinery (commodity code 
29), electrical, communication and precision equipment (commodities code 31-33) and 
motor vehicles (commodity code 34).  
So far, investments in the energy sector have been a priority in the use of 
climate finance (UNFCCC, 2014a). According to our results, this may have produced 
substantial spill-overs for donors. Agriculture and water, the main sectors receiving 
finance for adaptation, are also associated with the generation of substantial spill-overs 
due to the requirements of machinery (commodity code 29) and research and 
development services (commodity code 73) (see Figure 2). Asia and the Pacific region 
(including two recipients that generate large spill-overs, such as China and Indonesia) 
are the main recipients of past climate finance. This would suggest that the search for 
spill-overs has been one of the factors determining the international allocation of 
climate finance. However, a significant proportion of funds has been used for mitigation 
in the forestry sector in Latin America, a fact that would not be consistent with the 
prospects of spill-over effects. 
On the other hand, projects that are most able to stimulate recipient countries’ 
economies are those intensive in locally produced services like construction work 
(commodity code 45) and other business services (commodity code 74), as it is the case 
for many adaptation options. Allocating the same priority to support for adaptation as to 
mitigation has recently become a core element rather than a peripheral issue in the 
United Nations’ climate talks, especially due to developing countries’ demands 
(Galarraga and Román, 2015, 2013; GCF, 2014). This position in favour of increased 
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support for adaptation by developing countries would make sense from the perspective 
of trying to increase the local impact of climate finance disbursements. 
To sum up, the donor’s bias towards funding renewable energy projects and the 
developing countries’ demand for more funding for adaptation would be consistent with 
the economic interests of each group of countries, in the light of our results. Results also 
provide insights about an additional aspect that should be borne in mind when assessing 
alternative investment options from the point of view of both donors and recipients.  
Our results reinforce the idea that the impacts of climate finance are best 
assessed on a global scale, and demonstrate the potential of GMRIO databases as tools 
for analysing economy-wide impacts of climate finance. However, the already 
mentioned shortcomings of the IO method apply here too. Also recall that our 
assessment only considers the positive short-term effects associated with new 
expenditures, but it does not account for other impacts on the medium/long term 
associated with potential displaced expenditures, changes in prices or income.  
There are several ways to extend the present research: first, by broadening the 
scope of analysis to include additional countries. Our analysis only considers five major 
recipient countries. This might lead to an underestimation of the size of spill-over 
effects, since it has already been argued that small countries generate more spill-overs 
(see, for example, Dietzenbacher et al., 2012).  
This connects with a second possible extension of our research: identifying 
factors that can explain the results. Despite the fact that all recipient countries 
considered are big economies, Table 3 shows differences in the ability of these 
countries to retain the impacts of similar types of investment. Apart from size, 
Dietzenbacher et al. (2012) point to the openness of economies to explain the size of 
spill-overs. The small spill-overs generated by Brazil could thus be a consequence of 
the big size of its economy and the low dependency on imports (ibid). Beutel (2002) 
points to two additional factors: development level and competitiveness. In fact, 
competitiveness might provide an explanation of results for Mexico: despite the big size 
of the Mexican economy, its weaker competitive position in relation to the USA 
economy could explain the size of the spill-overs between the two countries. 
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Competitiveness might also help us understand why EU countries and the USA, among 
the donors, and China, among the recipients, are where most relevant spill-overs 
occur13. Other factors that could be included in the study of the determinants of the 
magnitude of spill-overs are the productive specialization and the geographic location. 
As previously explained, value-added includes labour remuneration and capital 
compensation. Thus, one part of the impact accrues to workers and the rest to owners of 
capital. According to Timmer et al. (2014), from 1995 to 2008 the capital share of 
value-added has increased globally, but especially in emerging countries such as China, 
India, Brazil and Mexico. Given the sizeable foreign investment flows, it can be 
imagined that a significant part of the domestic impact of climate actions in emerging 
regions is in the form of revenues of multinational companies, whose headquarters are 
in the most economically advanced regions. Our results do not enable to observe these 
kind of spill-overs. So, a third possible extension of this chapter would consist in 
separating labour and capital impacts and, within the latter, differentiating the part 
corresponding to foreign capital. 
2.5. Conclusions 
Studies assessing the economic impacts of climate-related expenditures at the national 
level have noted the relevant role of international trade. For instance, Lehr et al. (2008) 
conclude that if low-carbon technologies create employment in Germany, this is due to 
exports. Other studies also show that the ability to retain economic gains depends on the 
share of components that can be domestically manufactured (Ciorba et al., 2004; 
Markaki et al., 2013; Oliveira et al., 2013). These previous findings point to the relative 
position of economies in international markets as a factor determining the economic 
gains from climate investments. 
Our results confirm that international trade has an important role in the 
distribution of the economic benefits of climate finance. While the largest portion of the 
value-added generated by climate actions is domestic (71% on average), a significant 
                                               
13 Six European countries, the USA and Japan were in the top-ten global competitiveness ranking 2011-
2012. China occupies the highest position amongst the BRICS, and Mexico is on the 58th place out of 144 
in the global ranking (Schwab, 2011). 
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share (29% on average) spills over to other economies. Spill-overs accruing to the group 
of donor countries range from 10% to 28%, depending on the recipient country. 
The magnitude of the spill-overs varies with the nature of the project. 
Deployment of renewable energy technologies generates large spill-over effects, while 
M&A actions produce substantial domestic impact and limited spill-overs. The type of 
actions that offer recipient countries the best opportunities to grow do not coincide with 
those that benefit donor countries the most, with substantial spill-overs. Nevertheless, 
there are some mitigation and adaptation options that involve substantial benefits in 
terms of value-added in both donor and recipient countries (i.e. renewable energy 
sources like CSP and offshore wind, infrastructures for transport and adaptation, and 
water supply and management projects). 
While renewable energy deployment is the type of intervention with better 
return in terms of spill-overs for all donors, some differences have been identified. The 
USA benefits from substantial spill-overs from any type of climate project that is 
implemented in Mexico. Largest spill-overs to the EU come from renewable energy 
projects implemented in China and Mexico. ODC similarly benefit from renewable 
energy investments in China, Mexico and Indonesia, while EA benefits especially from 
renewable energy in Indonesia.  
Several climate actions have been identified to be unlikely to find funding 
opportunities if donors made their decisions exclusively based on the prospects of 
capturing value-added impacts. This is the case of coastal protection in Indonesia, where 
two million people are exposed to rising sea level (IPCC, 2001b). For that reason, the 
international community should implement mechanisms to ensure that sufficient climate 
financial flows reach the most vulnerable regions. 
Taking into account that the Long-term Finance commitments of higher-
income countries under the United Nations’ climate talks entail reaching USD 100 
billion per year by 202014, spill-over effects may add up to several billion USD per year. 
Thus, our results constitute valuable information for governments to help them 
                                               
14 This amount is similar to the level of total net official development assistance and official aid received 
in 2005: USD 108.45 billion (The World Bank, 2016). 
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understand the economic consequences of decisions about climate finance allocation. 
For example, our results suggest that correcting the current bias towards mitigation in 
climate finance flows would not only enhance developing countries’ climate resilience, 
but also it would contribute to their economic growth. 
Finally, our results also suggest that some recipient countries have significant 
room for manoeuvre for improving their ability to retain the value-added generated by 
capital-intensive projects, such as those involving renewable energy technologies. Such 
projects require machinery, transportation and communication equipment, and mineral 
and metal inputs that must typically be brought from abroad. Thus, in order to maximise 
the domestic impact of climate finance, recipient countries could pursue strategies 
aimed at improving the competitiveness of their industrial sectors. Technology transfer 
programmes may also enhance the ability of these countries to decrease their 
dependency on imports of capital goods that generate relevant spill-overs. As long as 
such programmes help to build up competitive industries that can provide substitutes for 
the imported goods, the domestic impact of climate finance may multiply.  
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2.6. Appendix 
Table 5. NACE classification of commodities 
Code Description 
1 Products of agriculture, hunting and related services 
2 Products of forestry, logging and related services 
5 Fish and other fishing products; services incidental of fishing 
10 Coal and lignite; peat 
11 Crude petroleum and natural gas; services incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying 
12 Uranium and thorium ores 
13 Metal ores 
14 Other mining and quarrying products 
15 Food products and beverages 
16 Tobacco products 
17 Textiles 
18 Wearing apparel; furs 
19 Leather and leather products 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork (except furniture); articles of straw and plaiting materials 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 
22 Printed matter and recorded media 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels 
24 Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 
25 Rubber and plastic products 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 
27 Basic metals 
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
29 Machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.) 
30 Office machinery and computers 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
35 Other transport equipment 
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods n.e.c. 
37 Secondary raw materials 
40 Electrical energy, gas, steam and hot water 
41 Collected and purified water, distribution services of water 
45 Construction work 
50 Trade, maintenance and repair services of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
52 Retail trade services, except for motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair services of personal and household goods 
55 Hotel and restaurant services 
60 Land transport; transport via pipeline services 
61 Water transport services 
62 Air transport services 
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport services; travel agency services 
64 Post and telecommunication services 
65 Financial intermediation services, except insurance and pension funding services 
66 Insurance and pension funding services, except compulsory social security services 
67 Services auxiliary to financial intermediation 
70 Real estate services 
71 Renting services of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods 
72 Computer and related services 
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Table 5. NACE classification of commodities (cont.) 
Code Description 
73 Research and development services 
74 Other business services 
75 Public administration and defence services; compulsory social security services 
80 Education services 
85 Health and social work services 
90 Sewage and refuse disposal services, sanitation and similar services 
91 Membership organisation services n.e.c. 
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting services 
93 Other services 
95 Private households with employed persons 
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3. Spatial decomposition analysis of the economic 
benefits of climate finance 
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3.1. Introduction 
For many countries the lack of financial resources is a barrier to the successful 
implementation of an appropriate mix of policies to mitigate climate change and its 
impacts. The Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009) acknowledges that supporting 
developing countries’ efforts to reduce emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate 
change will be essential to any new climate deal. The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 
2015) confirms the commitment by developed countries to transfer USD 100 billion to 
developing countries from 2020 on and stipulates that, for the period after the year 
2025, a more ambitious goal will be set. 
As climate finance has started to flow, a growing body of literature seeks to 
understand the role and the effectiveness of international climate funds in enabling a 
climate compatible development. Climate finance literature encompasses different 
aspects, covering climate finance architecture (Buchner et al., 2015; Schalatek et al., 
2015), the estimation of climate finance needs (UNEP, 2014a, 2014b), the assessment 
of climate finance effectiveness (Chaum et al., 2011; Urpelainen, 2012a; Vandeweerd et 
al., 2012), the compatibility of climate finance with countries’ interests (Buob and 
Stephan, 2013; Heuson et al., 2012; Schenker and Stephan, 2014), the role of climate 
finance in international agreements on climate change (Barrett, 2009; Barrett and 
Stavins, 2003; de Zeeuw, 2015; Pittel and Rübbelke, 2013; Rübbelke, 2011) or the 
assessment of different options for climate finance mobilisation and disbursement (Hof 
et al., 2011; Urpelainen, 2012b).  
The present chapter seeks to contribute to this body of literature by studying 
the factors that determine the size and spatial distribution of the economic benefits of 
climate finance. Value-added creation, which reflects the remuneration of primary 
production factors (i.e. labour and capital), can be used as a measure of the economic 
benefits of a particular intervention. In our case, the intervention studied consists of 
climate finance disbursements generating new demand for goods and services. In order 
to respond to this new demand, industries involved in the production of these goods and 
services pay employees and capital owners, creating value-added. The entire amount of 
financial resources transferred to the recipient country is finally transformed into value-
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added in different countries of the world to remunerate the production factors involved. 
The proportion of the value-added created that is domestically retained is referred to as 
the local economic impact of climate finance. The remainder constitutes the spill-over 
effect resulting from international trade15.  
The geographic distribution of value-added creation differs depending on 
where climate finance is disbursed. In Chapter 2, we quantified the domestic impact and 
spill-overs of different types of climate actions for different countries. The present 
chapter supplements this previous research by explaining the observed differences 
between countries’ ability to capture economic impacts. In order to do this, we apply a 
technique based on IO tables, i.e. the SDA, that has extensively been used in climate 
change literature to quantify the contribution of different factors to the growth in GHG 
emissions, and to assess the outsourcing of emissions phenomenon and carbon 
footprints (as Lenzen, 2016 explains), but that, to the best of our knowledge, has not 
been applied to explain the contribution of climate finance to countries’ economies.  
With this work we seek to bring to light the relative importance of the factors 
that determine the scale of the value-added created in both donors and recipients by 
climate finance disbursements. Our specific research questions are the following: (1) 
What is the contribution of each of these factors to the differences observed between 
countries? (2) What factors and industries offer the highest potential for increasing the 
economic impact of climate finance in each country?  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the 
methodology; Section 3.3 contains the results at both aggregated and sectoral levels; 
Section 3.4 discusses the main outcomes and contains some conclusions. 
3.2. Materials and methods 
To quantify the contribution of each factor in explaining the differences between 
countries in the scale of value-added impact, we apply a SDA within a GMRIO 
framework. This technique is normally used to decompose changes in a variable over 
                                               
15 Note that the economic effects referred to in this chapter are those generated by the use of climate 
finance. Other authors have studied the economic consequences of the mobilization of financial resources 
(see, for example, Basu et al., 2011; IMF, 2011; Jones et al., 2013; Parker et al., 2010). 
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time. For example, Xu and Dietzenbacher (2014) and Arto and Dietzenbacher (2014) 
used this method to identify the factors driving the change in GHG emissions by 
comparing different years. Like Alcántara and Duarte (2004), de Nooij et al. (2003) and 
Hasegawa (2006), we perform a spatial SDA, which consists on comparing different 
locations with data for the same year.  
The main data source for our analysis is the WIOD for the year 2011 (Timmer 
et al., 2012)16. We consider as climate finance recipient countries the five developing 
countries for which data are available in the WIOD: India, Brazil, China, Indonesia and 
Mexico17. We include Germany, UK, Japan and USA as donors, since these are the 
most important donors for which data are available in the WIOD (Climate Funds 
Update, 2016)18. The information in these tables (transactions between industries, 
purchases of end products, remuneration of labour and capital, and total output of each 
industry in each country, in monetary terms), enables us to trace value-added creation 
associated with a specific demand shock back to the country where it is created. 
Demand shocks are defined for different types of climate actions as a specific 
distribution of the budget between the different industries in the economy (or cost 
structure). The types of climate action studied include the most widely used renewable 
energy technologies worldwide: onshore wind, solar thermal and hydropower. Data 
used in previous studies (Lehr et al., 2012, 2008), reflecting the cost structures of 
projects in Germany in 2011, are used to define the cost structures of these types of 
climate action. Another mitigation action studied is energy efficiency measures in 
buildings (i.e. building insulation). Data for defining the cost structure of building 
insulation are taken from Markaki et al. (2013). Finally, different adaptation actions are 
also considered. For the sake of tractability of results, adaptation options are grouped 
into hard and soft adaptation. Table 9 in the Appendix (Section 3.5.2) contains all the 
adaptation measures considered and the sources of information used, which are specific 
                                               
16 For a detailed description of the WIOD project, the WIOT and main weaknesses see also 
Dietzenbacher et al. (2013b) and Timmer et al. (2015). 
17 Note that China appears here only as recipient, but it is also an important donor in South-to-South 
cooperation (Buchner et al., 2015; Zadek and Flynn, 2013). 
18 Another relevant contributor to climate finance is Norway, but it is not included in the WIOD. 
Analysed donors together represent 62% of the climate finance pledged as for October 2016 (Climate 
Funds Update, 2016). 
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Priority Project Profile documents from NAPA (UNFCCC, 2014b) 19. The cost structure 
for hard and soft adaptation is the average cost structure of the selected projects.  
Since some sources of information report budget allocations in terms of 
commodities, the correspondence reported in Table 10 of the Appendix (Section 3.5.2) 
is used to express cost structures in terms of industries. We use the same classification 
as the WIOD (CPA-NACE) in order to connect this information with the GMRIO 
framework20. Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of the expense in each type of climate 
action between the different industries. 
The production induced by demand shocks initiates a sequence of requirements 
of intermediate goods and services, and value-added generation across different 
industries and countries. All these relations can be captured by a GMRIO model as 
described next. Let be  
-1
ˆ=r r rv x w  the vector of value-added coefficients, where rx is 
the column vector of gross outputs in country r,  
-1
ˆ rx is the inverse of the diagonal 
matrix of this vector and w r is a column vector of value-added in country r with 
elements 
r
iw  indicating the value-added created in each sector i of that country; 
rsZ is 
the matrix of intermediate inputs from country r to country s, with elements 
rs
ijz indicating the sales of sector i in country r to sector j in country s;  
1
ˆrs rs s

A Z x  is 
the matrix of input coefficients.  
1
-

L I A  is the Leontief inverse matrix, where I is 
an identity matrix of the appropriate dimension; 
stf  is the column vector with final 
demand, with elements 
st
jf  indicating the final demand in country t for products of 
sector j produced by country s. We can calculate the fraction of the total final demand in 
country t for commodities of sector j imported from country s (when s t ) or 
domestically produced (when s t ) as 
st
jst
j st
j
s
f
t
f


. 
                                               
19 The choice of adaptation actions is based on categorizations of previous studies (Blazejczak et al., 
2014; Buchner et al., 2013; OECD/IEA, 2014; Prowse and Snilstveit, 2010; REN21, 2014, p. 21). 
20 CPA is the statistical classification of products by activity, and each CPA product is related to activities 
defined by the NACE. 
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Figure 7. Distribution to industries of expenses by climate action 
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Source: Own work based on Lehr et al. (2012, 2008), Markaki et al. (2013) and UNFCCC (2014b). 
Notes: Metals and other minerals includes industries c11 and c12; Machinery and equipment includes 
industries c13, c14 and c15; Construction corresponds to industry c18; Other business activities 
corresponds to industry c30; Other industries includes industries c1, c2, c7, c8, c9, c10, c17, c20, c23, 
c26, c27, c28, c29, c31, c33 and c34. See Table 10 for the explanation of the codes. Abbreviations: B. 
insul. means building insulation; Soft A. and Hard A. mean soft and hard adaptation. 
The column vector 
stt indicates the trade structure of country t. Finally, we 
define ae  as the column vector of the demand shock, with elements 
a
je  indicating the 
proportion of the total expenditure on a specific climate action a spent in sector j. With 
these elements we can calculate the value-added created in country r as a consequence 
of the implementation of climate action a in the recipient country t as 
w 'rta r rs st a
s
 v L t e   (1) 
Where  denotes the Hadamard product (i.e. the element by element 
multiplication). This expression shows the value-added of country r as the product of a 
series of factors. Once the local value-added derived from climate finance in each 
country is calculated, the country with greatest impact is identified as the benchmark 
against which other countries are compared. Within the recipient countries group, the 
benchmark is the country that is able to retain the largest part of the total value-added 
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created. Donor countries are compared to the country able to attract the largest 
proportion of spill-over effects.  
Thus, the difference in the value-added created by the implementation of 
climate action a in country t between two countries: B (the benchmark) and C (each of 
the rest of countries in the group) is given by the following expression:  
w ' 'v L t e v L t e     ta B Bs st a C Cs st a
s s
 (2) 
The difference in the value-added captured by recipient and donor countries is 
given by the following expressions respectively: 
w ' 'a B Bs sB a C Cs sC a
s s
     v L t e v L t e
 (3) 
w ' '              ,v L t e v L t e      ta B Bs st a C Cs st a
s s
t B C
 (4) 
We can operate in Equation 3 and Equation 4 in order to decompose the 
differences in the value-added as the sum of a series of factors21. For instance, for the 
case of recipients, and following Dietzenbacher and Los (1998), Equation 3 can be 
decomposed as the average of the two polar decompositions,  1 21w Δ +Δ2 
a a aw w , 
where  
1Δ = (Δ ') + '(Δ )  + ' (Δ )
a Bs sB a C s sB a C Cs s a
s s s
w     v L t e v L t e v L t e   (5) 
2Δ ( ') '( ) ' ( )
a Cs sC a B s sC a B Bs s a
s s s
w           v L t e v L t e v L t e   (6) 
And 
   Δ ' = ' 'v v vB C   (7) 
s B,s C
(Δ )=( )+( )+ ( ) 
 
  L L L L L L Ls BB CC BC CB Bs Cs  (8) 
                                               
21 For the sake of simplicity we just show the differences in recipient countries; the procedure to compare 
donor countries is very similar (see Appendix in Section 3.5.1). 
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   
s B,s C
Δ + ( )
 
    t t t t t t ts BB CC CB BC sB sC  (9) 
Thus, the average of the polar decomposition is  
 
 
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2 2
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 
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 
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The second and third terms of Equation 10 can be further decomposed. The 
resulting expression is  
 
   
   
   
 
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s B C s B C
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 (11) 
Equation 11 decomposes the difference in the value-added generated in donor 
countries as the sum of series factors, which can be aggregated into four:  
 1VAiE '
2
Bs sB a Cs sC a
s
     v L t e L t e   (12) 
   1 1DME ' '
2 2
B BB CC CC a C BB CC BB a     v L L t e v L L t e  (13) 
   
   
, ,
1 1
FME ' '
2 2
1 1
' '
2 2
B BC CB CC a C BC CB BB a
B Bs Cs sC a C Bs Cs sB a
s B C s B C 
     
      
v L L t e v L L t e
v L L t e v L L t e
 (14) 
 1TSE ' '
2
C Cs B Bs s a
s
    v L v L t e   (15) 
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- VAiE is the value-added intensity effect, which reflects differences in value-
added per unit of domestic output. A positive (negative) VAiE means that the 
benchmark country (B) produces more (less) value-added per unit of output than 
the studied country (C). High value-added intensities are typical in countries 
specialised in the production of high technology commodities that require high-
skilled labour. 
- DME is the domestic multiplier effect, which reflects differences in domestic 
production per unit of domestic demand. A positive (negative) DME means that 
the amount of production generated in B per unit of demand of goods/services 
produced in B is bigger (smaller) than the amount of production generated in C 
per unit of demand of goods/services produced in C. High domestic multipliers 
are typical of highly integrated economies, characterised by the presence of 
industrial clusters for different commodities that are relatively independent of 
foreign production. 
- FME is the foreign multiplier effect, which reflects differences in domestic 
production per unit of demand of foreign products. A positive (negative) FME 
means that the amount of production generated in B per unit of goods/services 
produced by other countries is bigger (smaller) than the amount of production 
generated in C per unit of goods/services produced by other countries. High 
foreign multiplier effects are typical of countries that participate in global supply 
chains for many products and services.  
- TSE is the trade structure effect, which reflects differences in the demand of 
domestic products generated by a climate action. We assume that the demand 
shock generated by each type of climate action is similar for all recipient 
countries in terms of level and composition of commodities. But we take into 
account that the origin of the commodities varies depending on the recipient 
country. A positive (negative) TSE means that the demand of goods/services 
produced in B generated by the implementation of a particular climate action is 
larger (smaller) than the demand of goods/services produced in C generated by 
the implementation of the same action in C. In the case of recipient countries, 
this is the effect of the degree of dependency on final goods and services 
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produced abroad, something that is related to the size of the country. In the case 
of donors, this is the effect of the penetration of final products on the recipient 
countries’ markets. 
3.3. Results 
This section includes general considerations that apply to all the results. Results are then 
grouped into two subsections according to their level of detail. Aggregated results for 
each economy are presented first, followed by results at industry level. Results for 
climate finance recipient countries distinguish between the types of climate action 
implemented. In the case of donor countries the focus is exclusively on renewable 
energy technologies, since these are the climate actions that yield the largest spill-over 
effects (see Chapter 2). However, since the volume of spill-overs varies widely 
depending on the country receiving climate finance, results distinguish between the 
destinations of climate finance22.  
Results reflect the comparison between the benchmark country and each of the 
other countries in the group. Amongst recipient countries, the benchmark varies 
depending on the climate action implemented. Amongst countries benefiting from spill-
overs, the benchmark varies depending on the country receiving climate finance. Table 
6 shows the proportion of the impact retained by each recipient country, the proportion 
attracted by each donor country and the benchmark country in each case23.  
For example, we see that out of every USD 100 spent in wind energy in India, 
USD 72 stay within the country (in the form of wages or benefits of Indian companies). 
The rest goes to other countries participating in the production of final goods/services or 
intermediate inputs required for the wind power project. However, the same expenditure 
in Mexico would leave in the country only USD 44. The decomposition explains what 
drives the difference of USD 28 between India and Mexico. In the case of donors, we 
                                               
22 The SDA of spillovers depends on which country is the donor, which one is the recipient and what type 
of climate action is implemented. This three-fold dependency complicates the presentation and 
interpretation of results. We therefore concentrate on renewable energy technologies, because they are the 
actions that yield the largest spillovers for donors, and present average results for wind, hydropower and 
solar.  
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see that out of every USD 100 spent in mitigation projects in Mexico, USD 20 end up in 
the USA as wages or companies’ profits, due to their participation in the production of 
the inputs of the project. Japan, however, only receives three dollars. The 
decomposition shows the contribution of each of the four factors considered to this USD 
17 difference.  
Table 6. Local impact, spill-overs and benchmark countries24 
Percentage of locally retained impact 
Climate action BRA CHN IDN IND MEX 
Wind 70 68 59 72 44 
Solar 73 71 55 70 52 
Hydropower 71 71 49 72 42 
B. insul. 91 82 81 83 82 
Soft A. 87 79 76 85 76 
Hard A. 82 77 70 79 67 
Percentage of impact attracted by non-recipient countries 
Recipient country CHN DEU UK JPN USA 
BRA 6 3 1 1 4 
CHN - 3 1 4 4 
IDN 9 3 1 6 4 
IND 7 2 1 2 4 
MEX 9 3 1 3 20 
Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX 
(Mexico), DEU (Germany), UK (United Kingdom), JPN (Japan), USA (United States of America), B. 
insul. (building insulation), Soft A. (soft adaptation), Hard A. (hard adaptation).  
Since benchmark countries are determined based on the economic impact at 
country level, aggregated results show always positive differences between the 
benchmark and other countries. This is not necessarily the case for results at industry 
level, where both positive and negative differences might appear. At both levels, the 
sign of the different effects (i.e. VAiE, DME, FME and TSE) can be either positive or 
negative, depending on whether they contribute positively to the dominant effect or 
counteract it. In other words, positive effects help explaining why benchmarks are 
benchmarks, and negative effects explain why differences between benchmarks and 
other countries are not even larger.  
                                                                                                                                          
23 Note that China is the benchmark country against which donor countries are compared in the case of 
climate finance disbursed in Brazil, Indonesia and India, because in those cases China is the country that 
benefits from the largest spillovers. 
24 Benchmark countries are indicated in grey. 
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3.3.1. Aggregated Results  
In this section, the results for each climate finance recipient country are shown first, 
followed by results for each donor country. Figure 8 and Figure 9 illustrate the results 
for recipient and donor countries.  
To explain the content of Figure 8 we continue with the previous example: the 
USD 28 of difference between the domestic impact in India and Mexico is because the 
trade structure generates USD 19 more in India than in Mexico, the domestic multiplier 
generates USD 12 more in India than in Mexico and the value-added intensity generates 
three dollars more in Mexico than in India. 
Brazil is the benchmark for all types of climate action except wind power and 
hydropower, for which the largest local economic benefits happen in India. However, 
Brazil is very close to the benchmark even there, with a local impact that is only one 
percentage point (pp) lower in the case of hydropower and two percentage points lower 
in the case of wind power. In both cases, the effects that contribute positively to the 
difference are the DME and the TSE. Counteracting these two factors is the VAiE.  
India is the benchmark for wind power and hydropower but is surpassed by 
Brazil in the rest of climate actions, with a difference of two percentage points for soft 
adaptation, three percentage points for solar and hard adaptation and eight percentage 
points for building insulation. In most cases (with the exception of soft adaptation), the 
VAiE contributes to the difference while the DME acts in the opposite direction.  
China is between one and nine percentage points from the benchmark 
countries, depending on the climate action. The largest differences are for building 
insulation and soft adaptation (nine and eight percentage points respectively). But we 
see as a common pattern for all climate actions that differences with the benchmark are 
the result of two contrary and sizeable effects: a positive VAiE (that surpasses 20 pp) 
and a negative DME effect (almost of the same magnitude). 
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Figure 8. Results by recipient country and climate action 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: VAiE (value-added intensity effect), DME (domestic multiplier 
effect), FME (foreign multiplier effect), TSE (trade structure effect), B. insul (building insulation), Soft 
A. (soft adaptation), Hard A. (hard adaptation). 
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Indonesia is farther from the benchmarks (between 10 and 23 pp), with the 
largest differences being found in renewable energy technologies (13-23 pp). In these 
cases, three factors contribute positively to the difference: mainly the TSE, but also the 
DME and the VAiE. The difference for building insulation (10 pp) results from the 
VAiE, which is partially offset by the DME. In the case of adaptation actions, the 
dominant effects are the VAiE and the TSE.  
Mexico is the farthest from benchmark countries: between 9-30 pp. Again, the 
largest differences are for renewable energy technologies (21-30 pp), and the lowest for 
building insulation (9 pp). This time the dominant effect in most cases is the TSE, with 
the DME as the other factor that contributes to the difference. In most cases, the VAiE 
also counteracts these former effects. The case of building insulation is different, with 
the TSE having no influence, and both the DME and the VAiE contributing positively 
to the difference. Note that the FME does not appear as a relevant factor in explaining 
the differences in the domestic economic impact of climate finance between recipient 
countries. 
To explain the results contained in Figure 9, we continue with the previous 
example: the USD 17 of difference between spill-overs captured by the USA and Japan 
from a mitigation project in Mexico are because the Mexican trade structure generates 
USD 12 more for the USA than for Japan, the foreign multiplier creates four dollars 
more in the USA than in Japan, the higher value-added intensity of the USA production 
causes two dollars of difference, and the domestic multiplier generates one dollar more 
in Japan than in the USA. 
Spill-overs attracted by Germany are only one percentage point lower than 
those attracted by the benchmark country (Japan) when the recipient country is China. 
The difference rises to 17 pp when the recipient country is Mexico (the benchmark 
country is the USA in this case). In general, the dominant effect is the TSE. Two other 
factors that also contribute positively to the difference are the DME and FME. Finally, 
the only factor that counteracts those effects is the VAiE, showing that value-added per 
unit of the German production is generally larger than in benchmark countries (with the 
exception of the USA). The same happens with the UK, whose results are very similar. 
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Differences are slightly larger in the case of the UK (between 3 and 19 pp), but the signs 
and relative magnitude of the different factors are the same than for Germany. 
Figure 9. Results by donor and recipient country 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: VAiE (value-added intensity effect), DME (domestic multiplier 
effect), FME (foreign multiplier effect), TSE (trade structure effect), B. insul (building insulation), Soft 
A. (soft adaptation), Hard A. (hard adaptation), BRA (Brazil), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX 
(Mexico). 
Japan is the benchmark country when China receives funding for deploying 
renewable energy technologies. In other cases, spill-overs captured by Japan are 
between 3 and 17 pp lower than those captured by the benchmark country: the average 
is four percentage points when then benchmark country is China and 17 pp when it is 
the USA. Again, the dominant factor is the TSE. The FME also contributes positively to 
the difference. The signs of the other two factors differ depending on the benchmark 
The Economics of Climate Finance 65 
 
country: when it is China, the DME increases the difference and the VAiE decreases it; 
when it is the USA, the opposite occurs.  
The USA is the benchmark when Mexico is the recipient country. In other 
cases differences with the benchmark countries do not exceed five percentage points. 
The most relevant factors are the TSE and VAiE. This latter counteracting the rest of the 
effects, something which indicates that value-added per unit of output is greater in the 
USA than in benchmark countries.  
3.3.2. Sectoral Results  
A small group of sectors concentrates the main effects in the countries analysed: 
“Mining and Quarrying”, “Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal”, “Machinery n.e.c.” 25, 
“Electrical and Optical Equipment”, “Electricity, Gas and Water Supply” (EGW), 
“Construction”, “Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles 
and Motorcycles”, “Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of 
Household Goods”, “Inland Transport”, “Financial Intermediation” and “Other 
Business Activities” (OBA). Figure 10 and Figure 11 in the Appendix (Section 3.5.2) 
illustrate the results for recipients and donor countries. 
In Brazil, the largest positive differences with the benchmark (India) appear in 
trade sectors (due to the VAiE, DME and TSE) and the transport sector (especially due 
to the DME). The sectors with the largest negative differences (around -2 pp) are metals 
and EGW (in wind and hydropower, respectively), especially due to the negative VAiE 
effect.  
When comparing India with the benchmark (Brazil), the most relevant 
difference at aggregated level is found in building insulation projects. This result can be 
explained by the large difference (16 pp) in the construction sector, associated with the 
VAiE. This effect in the construction sector may also explain the differences in solar 
and hard adaptation. Negative differences appear in metals, retail trade and transport for 
building insulation projects. These negative differences are generally driven by the 
DME.  
                                               
25 N.e.c. is the abbreviation of “not elsewhere classified”. 
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Sectoral results for China show that the differences observed in building 
insulation projects are associated with the construction sector (34 pp). The differences 
in soft adaptation are due to the OBA sector (13 pp), and those observed in hard 
adaptation are due to both the construction and OBA sectors (around 8 pp each). These 
differences are a consequence of a positive VAiE. Also noteworthy is the positive DME 
in the retail trade sector regardless of the type of action. This effect is negative at the 
aggregated level due to sectors such as metals and equipment. 
In Indonesia, metals and machinery sectors contribute to the large difference in 
renewable energy projects, especially due to the DME in the former and the TSE in the 
latter. The difference observed in building insulation projects might be explained in part 
by the VAiE in the construction sector. This effect in this sector might also influence 
the aggregated results in solar and hard adaptation projects. The VAiE in OBA and the 
TSE in machinery influence the differences in adaptation projects. This latter effect in 
the machinery sector contributes to the positive difference in all types of action except 
for building insulation. Notable negative differences are observed in the mining sector 
(up to 9 pp) regardless of the type of action, as a consequence of the DME and the 
VAiE.  
According to the sectoral results, the TSE in the machinery sector contributes 
to the differences observed for renewable energy projects in Mexico. Actually, this 
effect in this sector contributes to the difference in all types of project except for 
building insulation. Other sectors, such as metals, equipment and financial 
intermediation, also contribute to the difference in renewable energy actions due to the 
TSE and the DME. In this type of action, the role of the VAiE is negative with the 
exception of the equipment sector. In adaptation actions, the most influential effect is 
the TSE in machinery. Regarding negative differences, the OBA sector stands out, 
especially due to the VAiE in adaptation projects.  
Three sectors concentrate the most significant effects in explaining differences 
between donor countries: “Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal”, “Machinery n.e.c.” and 
“Electrical and Optical Equipment”. In the case of Germany, the TSE of these three 
sectors is especially influential, particularly when the benchmark countries are China 
and the USA. The UK and Japan present very similar results regarding the relative 
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importance of sectors and the signs of effects. The case of the USA is also similar, but 
with some noteworthy features such as the negative VAiE on the equipment and 
machinery sector, especially when the benchmark country is China26.  
3.4. Discussion and concluding remarks 
One of the reasons why Brazil, out of all the recipient countries considered in the 
analysis, is the one where climate finance produces the largest domestic impact in most 
cases (i.e. for solar energy, building insulation and adaptation projects) is the VAiE. 
According to the sectoral results, this effect makes the impact of mitigation actions 
larger in the Brazilian metals, EGW and construction sectors. Table 7, which shows 
value-added coefficients by country and sector, confirms that these sectors are relatively 
more intensive in primary inputs in Brazil than in the other recipient countries, which 
might be due to a higher level of sophistication in the production and the use of high 
technology and skilled labour. An alternative (or complementary) explanation for higher 
value-added per unit of output is a higher degree of protectionism in the economy. In 
fact, Brazil ranks at the bottom of the ICC open markets index for the year of study 
(ICC, 2011), behind the other recipient countries27. Thus, the high values of value-added 
per unit of output might also be due to a lack of competition with foreign producers, 
who find barriers to entry into Brazilian markets. The high value-added coefficient in 
the Brazilian EGW sector may be associated with the large share of hydropower in the 
Brazilian energy mix, an energy source with low requirements for intermediate inputs.  
When climate finance is spent on wind or hydropower projects, India is the 
recipient country with the largest domestic impact. According to our results, this is 
mainly due to the fact that India imports less final products than other recipient 
countries for undertaking such projects. According to the sectoral results, this effect 
means that the impact of these projects in the machinery industry is larger in India than 
in other recipient countries. Table 8, which shows the share of domestic production by 
industry in the final demand of recipient countries, confirms that India is, on average, 
the recipient country with the largest share of domestic production in its final demand. 
                                               
26 See original contribution in Román et al. (2016b) 
27 The position of recipient countries in ascending order is: Indonesia (54), China (57), Mexico (58), 
India (66), and Brazil (68). 
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India has also a high level of self-sufficiency in machinery, equipment and transport 
equipment, the main components of this type of projects. Moreover, demand for Indian 
products triggers greater domestic production (especially in the metals and transport 
sectors) than in other countries. Both effects reflect the high level of self-sufficiency and 
integration of the Indian economy, a relatively well developed, independent industrial 
base and the existence of intraregional communication and transport networks.  
Table 7. Value-added intensity by country and sector28 
(percentage) BRA CHN IDN IND MEX DEU UK JPN USA 
Agriculture 61 59 77 78 58 44 54 50 43 
Mining 44 47 82 79 82 47 71 20 57 
Pulp 46 25 37 29 46 40 48 45 38 
Coke 26 19 59 17 16 19 18 38 28 
Chemicals 36 21 31 31 31 39 40 28 35 
Rubber 40 19 35 19 33 41 44 25 37 
Non-Metallic Mineral 44 28 46 37 54 40 49 33 39 
Metals 41 21 31 26 37 35 40 27 33 
Machinery n.e.c. 38 24 30 31 38 40 43 36 44 
Equipment 37 17 37 30 20 42 42 32 64 
Transport Equip. 29 20 41 29 35 27 32 24 22 
EGW 57 29 31 36 36 52 38 44 72 
Construction 56 23 36 39 50 45 43 46 52 
Wholesale Trade 73 60 59 89 75 61 56 69 67 
Inland Transport 57 52 39 41 66 50 53 63 49 
Other Transport  57 39 78 54 73 42 49 58 65 
Post  50 59 65 70 63 50 51 65 58 
Financial  68 69 79 77 69 44 54 61 55 
Real Estate  93 83 55 92 91 81 67 87 70 
Other Business Activities 64 41 58 70 73 67 68 51 68 
Public Admin 68 55 56 100 71 68 53 69 60 
Health 62 35 55 66 74 72 44 62 63 
Personal Services 65 45 54 83 71 62 56 60 54 
Average 53 39 51 53 55 48 48 47 51 
Source: Own work based on WIOD. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), IDN (Indonesia), IND 
(India), MEX (Mexico), DEU (Germany), UK (United Kingdom), JPN (Japan), USA (United States of 
America). 
                                               
28 Colour gradients are used to compare values within the same row in order to help distinguish the 
countries with higher value-added intensities (in darker tones) from those with lower ones (in lighter 
tones). 
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China is the other side of the coin compared to Brazil: a lower weight of labour 
and capital in the total production costs of Chinese industries is the main reason why 
China is not able to retain a larger proportion of the impact of climate finance. 
According to sectoral results, the VAiE makes the impact of climate actions in the 
Chinese metals, construction and OBA sectors lower than in the benchmark cases. 
Table 8 confirms that China is the recipient country with the smallest value-added 
coefficients in almost all industries, including these three.  
Table 8. Proportion of domestic production in final demand by country29 
(percentage) BRA CHN IDN IND MEX 
Agriculture 98 98 97 99 96 
Mining 96 98 98 97 97 
Pulp 97 83 91 94 85 
Coke 88 85 40 97 57 
Chemicals 88 62 89 88 80 
Rubber 72 85 86 88 47 
Non-Metallic Mineral 83 94 93 75 97 
Metals 90 93 66 94 78 
Machinery n.e.c. 74 85 18 78 18 
Equipment 60 74 72 66 23 
Transport Equip. 84 85 81 94 40 
EGW 99 99 100 100 100 
Construction 100 100 100 100 100 
Wholesale Trade 100 99 100 99 100 
Inland Transport 99 98 96 100 100 
Other Transport  99 98 94 100 99 
Post  97 98 99 99 100 
Financial  99 99 99 98 97 
Real Estate  97 100 77 100 100 
Other Business Activities 99 95 100 97 99 
Public Admin 100 100 99 100 97 
Health 100 100 99 100 100 
Personal Services 99 98 98 99 98 
Average 92 92 87 94 83 
Source: Own work based on WIOD. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), IDN (Indonesia), IND 
(India), MEX (Mexico). 
Indonesia and Mexico are even farther away from the benchmarks than China, 
as a result of a combination of factors. First, both countries import a large part of their 
final demand. Sectoral results show relevant differences in the impact of renewable 
                                               
29 Colour gradients are used to compare values within the same row, in order to help distinguish countries 
with higher proportions of domestic production in their final demand (in darker tones) from lower ones 
(in lighter tones). 
70  
 
energy and adaptation projects in the metals and machinery sectors due to this effect. 
Table 8 confirms that these two countries are (on average and also in these two sectors) 
the recipient countries which depend most on others countries’ end products. Another 
factor that contributes to the lower impact of renewable energy projects is the fact that 
domestic demand generates less domestic production in the metals industry (i.e. metals 
required for domestic production are also more frequently imported).  
The salient feature of Indonesia is the domestic multiplier effect of the mining 
sector, which reduces the difference with the benchmark in the cases of renewable 
energy and energy efficiency projects. This reflects the fact that Indonesia is relatively 
self-sufficient in this sector. According to PwC (2014), the mining sector was very 
important in the Indonesian economy in 2011, accounting for 19.5% of the GDP. In 
Mexico, the salient feature is value-added per unit of output, especially in the metals 
and OBA sectors (see Table 7). This factor reduces the difference with the benchmark 
for renewable energy and adaptation projects. 
Major differences in the distribution of spill-overs of renewable energy projects 
appear when other donors are compared with the USA, the benchmark country when 
climate finance is disbursed in Mexico. According to our results, the main driver of 
these large differences is trade in both final and intermediate commodities. As Table 8 
shows, Mexico is relatively dependent on others countries’ production to meet its final 
demand, something that, together with the geographic proximity and accessibility of the 
American market, explains the significance of trade in end products (TSE). The 
relevance of trade in intermediate inputs (FME) is due to two facts: first, regional trade 
facilitated by proximity and trade treaties (i.e. North American Free Trade Agreement) 
also benefits the USA indirectly (i.e. via Mexican imports of Canadian products that 
require American intermediate inputs); and second, American industries are well 
positioned in global markets, which enables them to participate in global supply chains 
and capture a share of the economic benefits generated from consumption in many parts 
of the world30. According to the World Bank (2011), in 2011 the USA was the top 
                                               
30 In the comparison of recipient countries, the FME represents a feedback effect: the recipient country 
imports final goods and services that require intermediate inputs from the recipient country. According to 
our results, and in line with previous empirical evidence, feedback effects are negligible (Meng and Chao, 
2007). 
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market for world exports and the second exporting country. Results also show that the 
USA is the donor that creates most value-added per unit of output, followed by 
Germany and the UK. Japan is in the last place in this aspect. Note that this ranking is in 
line with the average value-added coefficients contained in Table 7.  
The fact that the largest spill-over effects, when the recipient is China, take 
place in Japan also reflects the effect of proximity in trade. However, the fact that China 
attracts spill-overs between 3-8 pp larger than any donor country when finance is 
disbursed in Brazil, Indonesia and India cannot be explained by geographic proximity. 
However, the prominent position of China in global trade - in 2011 it was the world’s 
number one exporter and number two importer, according to the World Bank (2011) - 
might provide an explanation for this result.  
Finally, a remark is required on the main limitation of this exercise, which lies 
on the assumptions required to determine the demands of different categories of actions 
for the sectors of the economy. Profiles for expenditure on mitigation actions are taken 
from the existing literature, but the characterisation of adaptation actions is the result of 
an ad-hoc selection process from the NAPA available on the UNFCCC website. The 
subsequent grouping into two main categories of adaptation (soft and hard), via the 
calculation of the corresponding averages, means neglecting some degree of variation. 
In particular, the largest standard deviations are associated with expenses in the 
construction and machinery sectors (34% and 18% for construction in hard and soft 
adaptation, respectively; 27% and 17% for machinery in hard and soft adaptation, 
respectively). Bearing in mind that adaptation actions are as varied as countries’ 
adaptation needs, the results of this study provide an estimate of the impact of the 
“typical” or “average” soft and hard adaptation actions.  
As it has been previously noted, the main aim of this chapter has been to try to 
understand the underlying factors explaining the different ability of countries for 
deriving economic benefits from climate finance. Regarding developing countries, our 
results show that in those countries where the industries involved in mitigation and 
adaptation projects are well developed and connected, and offer competitive products 
and services with high content of value-added, climate actions deliver larger economic 
benefits to the local population. This finding indicates that active policies to facilitate 
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the local development of such industries would deliver climate and development 
benefits at the same time.  
Some researchers have suggested that there is a need to align climate finance 
and development finance, and that the effectiveness of climate finance depends on the 
capability of developing countries to manage the available sources of finance in favour 
of their national development strategies and needs (Haites, 2014; IPCC, 2014). 
Theoretical and empirical studies have suggested that climate action and development 
strategies might be complementary provided that climate change is considered in the 
design of development policies (Andreoni and Miola, 2014; Chambwera et al., 2014; 
Fankhauser and McDermott, 2014; Halsnæs and Verhagen, 2007). Here, we support this 
idea and identify three areas of action where governments of developing countries can 
focus in order to exploit this complementarity: 1) the value-added content (skilled 
labour and high technology) of production; 2) the integration of the economy; and 3) the 
degree of self-sufficiency in climate-related industries. 
In the case of donor countries, the first two recommendations also apply. 
Moreover, our analysis shows that trade interconnections with recipient countries 
increase the ability of countries to capture spill-overs. Based on these findings, donors 
could be tempted to focus climate aid on their specific commercial area. However, 
given the increasing limitations on donors’ discretion to decide the destination of 
climate finance, an alternative strategy would be to increase participation in global 
supply chains of high-quality products and services related to the fight against climate 
change31. This would enable them to profit from global climate action regardless of 
where it takes place, and from climate finance flows regardless of who mobilises them. 
Thus, our findings suggest that countries which seek to benefit from spill-overs of 
climate action could promote globally competitive industries in the sectors involved in 
climate action.  
Summarizing, this exercise provides an evidence of the compatibility of 
climate action with economic gains. Our results suggest that both donors and recipient 
                                               
31 This is the purpose underlying the choice of a multi-lateral channel such as the GCF, with equal 
participation of developed and developing countries in their government bodies, as the main channel for 
future financial aid. 
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countries should strategically direct their development towards climate-related 
industries with high value-added content if they want to enjoy from larger shares of the 
economic benefits associated to the increasing amounts of climate finance. This is a 
very relevant message, since the search for short-term economic co-benefits of climate 
action could promote the (currently still lacking) coordination of countries for the 
development of solutions for this global environmental problem.  
Finally, we conclude that GMRIO models have great potential to contribute to 
discussions on the global climate regime. So far they have provided interesting insights 
on the topic of responsibility with evidences of carbon footprint and leakage. With this 
chapter we explore a different avenue of research that focuses on the opportunities of 
the required transition towards decarbonized and resilient societies. 
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3.5. Appendix  
3.5.1. Comparison between donor countries 
In this case, we depart from Equation 4:  
w ' '              ,v L t e v L t e      a B Bs st a C Cs st a
s s
t B C  (16) 
The two polar decompositions ( 1w  and 2w ) are: 
1Δ = (Δ ') + '(Δ )  + ' (Δ )
ta Bs st a C s st a C Cs t a
s s s
w     v L t e v L t e v L t e   (17) 
2Δ ( ') '( ) ' ( )
ta Cs st a B s st a B Bs t a
s s s
w           v L t e v L t e v L t e   (18) 
Where 
   Δ ' = ' 'v v vB C   (19) 
s B,s C
(Δ )=( )+( )+ ( ) 
 
  L L L L L L Ls BB CC BC CB Bs Cs  (20) 
 Δ  t t tt Bt Ct   (21) 
And the average of the polar decomposition is  1 1 22Δw w w    or 
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 (22) 
Equation 23 to Equation 26 show the decomposition of the difference in value-
added created into the four components: VAiE, DME, FME and TSE.  
 1VAiE '
2
Bs st a Cs st a
s
     v L t e L t e   (23) 
       1 1DME ' '
2 2
B BB CC Ct a C BB CC Bt a     v L L t e v L L t e  (24) 
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3.5.2. Additional tables and figures 
Table 9. Types of adaptation actions and sources of information 
Hard adaptation  NAPA
 
Coastal protection 
Beach nourishment GAMBIA #9 
Coastal protection structures CAPE VERDE #3 
Rehabilitation of coastal areas SIERRE LEONE #18 
Disaster risk reduction 
Early warning or emergency response systems GAMBIA #1 
Construction or improvement of drainage systems BHUTAN #5 
Flood protection BHUTAN #7 
Hazard mapping and monitoring technologies BHUTAN #9 
Improved climate services SIERRE LEONE #2 
Water supply and 
management 
Rainwater harvesting and storage SUDAN #2 
Rehabilitation of water distribution networks SIERRE LEONE #12 
Desalinization, water recycling and water conservation TUVALU #3 
Human settlements, 
infrastructure and spatial 
planning 
Energy security (hydropower) TANZANIA #5 
Energy security (solar energy) SIERRE LEONE #8 
Energy security (biomass) GAMBIA #6 
Transport and road infrastructure adaptation MALDIVES #10 
Protection of infrastructure BHUTAN #6 
Zoning SAMOA #6 
Improving the resilience of existing infrastructures/buildings MALDIVES #8 
Waste and wastewater 
Sanitation SIERRE LEONE #22 
Storm and wastewater MALDIVES #5 
Soft adaptation NAPA 
Forestry and land use/ 
Terrestrial Ecosystems 
Afforestation and reforestation ERITREA #3 
Ecological restoration and soil conservation LESOTHO #6 
Protection of biodiversity TUVALU #5 
Forest management, management of slopes and basins BURUNDI #3 
Forest fires reduction BHUTAN #11 
Capacity-building 
Awareness raising and integrating into education BURUNDI #11 
Technical assistance MALAWI #5 
Planning, policy development and implementation SIERRE LEONE #19 
Agriculture, fishing and 
livestock 
Crop / animal diversification SIERRE LEONE #5 
Crop, grazing land, livestock and fisheries enhanced management ERITREA #2 
Research MALDIVES #9 
Irrigation and drainage system SIERRE LEONE #7 
Social protection 
Livelihood diversification MALAWI #1 
Food storage and preservation facilities LESOTHO #8 
Health, vaccination programs SIERRE LEONE #23 
Source: Own work.  
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Table 10. Correspondence between industry and commodity codes  
Industry 
NACE 
classification 
Description 
Commodity 
CPA 
classification 
Description 
c1 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and 
Fishing 
1 
Products of agriculture, hunting and 
related services 
2 
Products of forestry, logging and related 
services 
5 
Fish and other fishing products; services 
incidental of fishing 
c2 Mining and Quarrying 
10 Coal and lignite; peat 
11 
Crude petroleum and natural gas; services 
incidental to oil and gas extraction 
excluding surveying 
12 Uranium and thorium ores 
13 Metal ores 
14 Other mining and quarrying products 
c3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 
15 Food products and beverages 
16 Tobacco products 
c4 Textiles and Textile Products 
17 Textiles 
18 Wearing apparel; furs 
c5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 19 Leather and leather products 
c6 
Wood and Products of Wood and 
Cork 
20 
Wood and products of wood and cork 
(except furniture); articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 
c7 
Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and 
Publishing 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 
22 Printed matter and recorded media 
c8 
Coke, Refined Petroleum and 
Nuclear Fuel 
23 
Coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuels 
c9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 24 
Chemicals, chemical products and man-
made fibres 
c10 Rubber and Plastics 25 Rubber and plastic products 
c11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 Other non-metallic mineral products 
c12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 
27 Basic metals 
28 
Fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
c13 Machinery n.e.c. 29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
c14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 
30 Office machinery and computers 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
32 
Radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
33 
Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 
c15 Transport Equipment 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
35 Other transport equipment 
c16 Manufacturing, n.e.c.; Recycling 
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods n.e.c. 
37 Secondary raw materials 
c17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 
40 Electrical energy, gas, steam and hot water 
41 
Collected and purified water, distribution 
services of water 
c18 Construction 45 Construction work 
c19 
Sale, Maintenance and Repair of 
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; 
Retail Sale of Fuel 
50 
Trade, maintenance and repair services of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale 
of automotive fuel 
c20 
Wholesale Trade and Commission 
Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles 
51 
Wholesale trade and commission trade 
services, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
Source: Own work. 
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Table 10. Correspondence between industry and commodity codes (cont.) 
Industry 
NACE 
classification 
Description 
Commodity 
CPA 
classification 
Description 
c21 
Retail Trade, Except of Motor 
Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of 
Household Goods 
52 
Retail trade services, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles; repair services 
of personal and household goods 
c22 Hotels and Restaurants 55 Hotel and restaurant services 
c23 Inland Transport 60 
Land transport; transport via pipeline 
services 
c24 Water Transport 61 Water transport services 
c25 Air Transport 62 Air transport services 
c26 
Other Supporting and Auxiliary 
Transport Activities; Activities of 
Travel Agencies 
63 
Supporting and auxiliary transport 
services; travel agency services 
c27 Post and Telecommunications 64 Post and telecommunication services 
c28 Financial Intermediation 
65 
Financial intermediation services, except 
insurance and pension funding services 
66 
Insurance and pension funding services, 
except compulsory social security services 
67 
Services auxiliary to financial 
intermediation 
c29 Real Estate Activities 70 Real estate services 
c30 
Renting of M&Eq and Other 
Business Activities 
71 
Renting services of machinery and 
equipment without operator and of 
personal and household goods 
72 Computer and related services 
73 Research and development services 
74 Other business services 
c31 
Public Admin and Defence; 
Compulsory Social Security 
75 
Public administration and defence 
services; compulsory social security 
services 
c32 Education 80 Education services 
c33 Health and Social Work 85 Health and social work services 
c34 
Other Community, Social and 
Personal Services 
90 
Sewage and refuse disposal services, 
sanitation and similar services 
91 Membership organisation services n.e.c. 
92 
Recreational, cultural and sporting 
services 
93 Other services 
c35 
Private Households with Employed 
Persons 
95 Private households with employed persons 
Source: Own work. 
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Figure 10. Top five sectors by recipient country and climate action 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: VAiE (value-added intensity effect), DME (domestic multiplier 
effect), FME (foreign multiplier effect), TSE (trade structure effect), B. insul (building insulation), Soft 
A. (soft adaptation), Hard A. (hard adaptation), EGW (electricity, gas and water supply), W. trade 
(wholesale trade), R. trade (retail trade), I. transport (inland transport), OBA (other business activities), 
E/O equip. (electric and optical equipment). 
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Figure 10. Top five sectors by recipient country and climate action (cont.) 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: VAiE (value-added intensity effect), DME (domestic multiplier 
effect), FME (foreign multiplier effect), TSE (trade structure effect), B. insul (building insulation), Soft 
A. (soft adaptation), Hard A. (hard adaptation), EGW (electricity, gas and water supply), W. trade 
(wholesale trade), R. trade (retail trade), I. transport (inland transport), OBA (other business activities), 
E/O equip. (electric and optical equipment). 
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Figure 11. Top five sectors by donor and recipient country 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: VAiE (value-added intensity effect), DME (domestic multiplier 
effect), FME (foreign multiplier effect), TSE (trade structure effect), B. insul (building insulation), Soft 
A. (soft adaptation), Hard A. (hard adaptation), EGW (electricity, gas and water supply), W. trade 
(wholesale trade), R. trade (retail trade), I. transport (inland transport), OBA (other business activities), 
E/O equip. (electric and optical equipment), BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India) 
and MEX (Mexico). 
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Figure 11. Top five sectors by donor and recipient country (cont.) 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: VAiE (value-added intensity effect), DME (domestic multiplier 
effect), FME (foreign multiplier effect), TSE (trade structure effect), B. insul (building insulation), Soft 
A. (soft adaptation), Hard A. (hard adaptation), EGW (electricity, gas and water supply), W. trade 
(wholesale trade), R. trade (retail trade), I. transport (inland transport), OBA (other business activities), 
E/O equip. (electric and optical equipment), BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India) 
and MEX (Mexico). 
  
 
 
4. Spill-over effects of climate finance: tied aid versus 
local content requirements 
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4.1. Introduction 
Climate change, due to its global public good nature, requires an internationally 
coordinated response by the largest emitters of GHGs. Given the asymmetries in terms 
of responsibility, capability and vulnerability between countries, North-to-South 
financial transfers play a key role in the coordination of the global action for curbing 
GHG emissions and facilitating adaptation by the most vulnerable countries to 
unavoidable changes in the atmospheric conditions. In the climate summits of 
Copenhagen (UNFCCC, 2009) and Cancun (UNFCCC, 2010) developed countries 
committed to jointly mobilize USD 100 billion per year from 2020 onwards to support 
mitigation and adaptation policies in developing countries. In this respect, two 
quantitative goals were set: USD 30 billion for the period 2010 – 2012 (i.e. the FSF) 
and USD 100 billion per year by 2020 (i.e. the Long-term Finance) (ibid). Besides, the 
so-called Paris Agreement points at raising ambition in terms of climate finance 
mobilization after 2025 (UNFCCC, 2015). 
With the objective of reaching the collective goals pledged in Copenhagen, 
developed countries have already started to mobilize funds from a variety of sources, 
which are disbursed through different channels to different countries for the 
implementation of climate actions with mitigation and/or adaptation purposes. The 
Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), an independent organization that, since 2011, tracks the 
flow of financial resources aimed at climate action, has reported USD 391 billion of 
climate finance in 2014 (Buchner et al., 2015). Most of this finance comes from private 
(62%) and domestic sources (74%). The OECD and the CPI have also estimated that in 
2013-2014 the North-to-South transfers reached USD 57 billion on average, 74% of 
which came from public sources (OECD and CPI, 2015)32.  
It can be expected that international climate finance flows will continue to 
grow in the near future as the deadline of 2020 approaches. Thus, it is very important 
that we understand the economic consequences of these international transfers of 
                                               
32 This report does not reflect the pledges to the GCF, an entity created in 2010 (at the 16th COP in 
Cancun) with the aim to channel most of the international funding, and that became operational in 2014 
(UNFCCC, 2010). Pledges to the GCF reached USD 10.3 billion on May 2016, something that makes the 
GCF the largest public climate fund. 
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financial resources. In Chapter 2, we have quantified the size of the impact associated to 
climate finance, differentiating between the domestic impact in value-added creation 
and the value-added that spills over to other countries (i.e. the so-called spill-over effect 
or spill-overs). Departing from the quantification of the spill-overs captured by different 
climate finance donors, in this chapter we focus on the influence of spending conditions 
such as tied aid and LCR on the size of spill-over effects, answering the following 
research questions: What is the effect of tied aid and LCR on the value-added captured 
by donor countries? What locations and industries are more sensitive to these practices? 
The scope of this exercise is, thus, limited to the economic consequences of the phase of 
climate finance disbursement. The economic implications of the previous phase of 
mobilization of climate finance is beyond the scope of this chapter33.We focus on a 
group of donor and recipient countries and on a set of 26 climate actions including most 
relevant mitigation options and adaptation solutions.  
The chapter is structured in six sections. After this brief introduction, Section 
4.2 provides an overview of the evidence on the use of tied aid and LCRs. Next, Section 
4.3 describes the methodology used to quantify the differences in spill-over effects 
arising from spending conditions. Section 4.4 presents the results, and these are 
subsequently discussed in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2. Tied aid and LCR 
A quite established result in the development aid literature is that donors tend to provide 
more support to trade partners34 (Hoeffler and Outram, 2011; Schraeder et al., 1998). 
Thus, Younas (2008) finds that OECD countries allocate more aid to recipient nations 
who import goods in which donor nations have a comparative advantage in production. 
However, this may not only be a consequence of comparative advantage in production 
but also the consequence of the practice of “tying” aid to the explicit obligation of 
buying products (or contracting services) from the donor’s industries35. Theoretical 
                                               
33 Several previous analysis study the economic consequences of alternative instruments for mobilizing 
climate finance (Basu et al., 2011; IMF, 2011; Jones et al., 2013; Keen et al., 2012; Parker et al., 2010). 
34 Dollar and Levin (2006) find that in the case of France, Japan and Portugal aid is highly correlated with 
their bilateral trade, but the trade variable is not relevant for other donors.  
35 This practice might respond to several factors such as the demand of donor country’s constituencies for 
a percentage of “domestic return” from the resources devoted to international aid, to a national strategy 
for expanding exports, or to the activity of a domestic lobby that, through its advocacy and influence, 
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studies suggest that the use of tied aid can be explained through rent-seeking behaviour, 
since such aid largely repatriates the transfer, giving rise to profits in the donor country 
(Brakman and van Marrewijk, 1995; Schweinberger, 1990). Wagner (2003) shows that 
approximately 50% of foreign aid in the 1990s was tied with exports and that the 
induced exports accounted for 133% of the resources transferred. However, this way of 
giving aid may be considered inefficient as it increases the costs of actions and 
negatively affects effectiveness of the intervention (Osei, 2005). Besides, it also creates 
trade distortions. Consequently, the Helsinki Package of discipline for tied aid, and the 
subsequent OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreements, set 
limitations for tied credits in the early 1990s (OECD, 2008). In 2001, the DAC made a 
recommendation for untying aid, which was reaffirmed in the Paris Declaration for Aid 
Effectiveness36 (OECD, 2005; OECD/DAC, 2014). The argued benefits of untied aid 
were the promotion of local businesses and the creation of capacities locally as well as a 
more effective transfer of knowledge (Clay et al., 2009).  
Since 2001, significant progress has been made in the elimination of legal and 
regulatory restrictions on the geographic origin of purchased goods and services. 
Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2014) find that the average positive effect of bilateral aid on 
exports decreases substantially over the period 1989-2007, which could suggest that the 
recommendations given by the OECD/DAC concerning the untying of aid have been 
followed by the donors and led to declining impacts on their exports. Thus, in 2007 tied 
aid was 24% of the total foreign aid37. However, the portion of actual tied aid is 
estimated to be much bigger, since technical cooperation and management components 
of most projects have been found to be, if not formally, de facto tied (Clay et al., 2009).  
In general, bilateral aid has a larger portion of tied aid. According to de 
Sépibus (2014), donors of climate finance are increasingly using “multi-bi-financing” 
channels at the expense of multilateral channels, because the former enable like-minded 
donors to earmark their contributions to particular objectives. Approximately 80% of 
                                                                                                                                          
shapes aid policy in a way that is of primarily benefit to itself (Brakman and van Marrewijk, 1995; 
Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2009; Selbervik and Nygaard, 2006). 
36 For the OECD agencies, this position has meant the loss of support from the business sector, who 
critically looks the Paris Declaration and the recommendation for untying aid (de Sépibus, 2014). 
37 Excluding technical cooperation and food support, with portions of tied aid of 30% and 50%, 
respectively. 
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FSF, and 56% of the public finance in 2013-2014 was channelled through bilateral aid 
institutions (OECD and CPI, 2015). Private-oriented finance, which includes developed 
country public flows to the private sector, is normally channelled through bilateral 
institutions. Buchner et al. (2015) estimate that 21% of public finance went to private 
entities, and 41% to public or public-private entities.  
Some evidence exists about the use of tied aid by the donor countries that will 
be considered in this article, namely Japan, USA, Germany and UK. Umeda (2011) 
claims that Japan has untied foreign aid beyond the requirements of the 
recommendations by the OECD/DAC. Thus, in 2007, 95% of Japanese aid was untied. 
However, Whitley (2012) shows that in the case of Japanese private-oriented climate 
finance, all beneficiaries were private entities using Japanese expertise or technology, or 
co-financed by Japanese banks. He concludes that Japanese private climate finance 
support has been guided by the objective of enhancing Japanese competitive advantages 
through the promotion of products with high value-added, including low carbon 
technologies.  
With regard to the USA, approximately half of its bilateral support to the 
private sector for climate action benefited directly or indirectly American companies. 
The main agencies involved require that beneficiaries are to some extent American, and 
have as mission creating jobs in the USA by financing exports to international buyers 
(Whitley and Mohanty, 2012).  
In the case of German foreign aid, Palmer (2011) concludes that “Germany has 
not entirely lived up to the recommendations on untying aid that were made by the 
OECD/DAC and the Accra Action Plan” since the federal budget often specifies that 
technical assistance is to be provided directly by German services. It reports that, in 
2008, 41% of German technical assistance was provided in the form of tied aid. 
Regarding private-oriented climate finance, Whitley and Mohanty (2013) report that 
19% of Germany’s private climate finance support identified for the period 2010 –2012 
involved German technology.  
With regard to the UK, Feikert-Ahalt (2011) reports that the UK is one of the 
first countries to completely “untie” aid. However, Whitley et al. (2012) point that UK’s 
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expertise in low carbon development is being promoted in emerging countries, and the 
Export Credits Guarantee Department offers support to exporters of low carbon 
technologies and renewable energies.  
On the other hand, LCR constitute a protectionist tool that restricts and distorts 
trade flows. LCR are provisions that regulate the extent to which certain projects must 
use local products. These provisions can be enacted at the state, sub-state or regional 
level and are usually tied to government concessions and public support schemes 
(Johnson, 2013; Kuntze and Moerenhout, 2012). The main objective of LCR in the 
short term is to maximize the positive impact of the influx of foreign financing and 
technology in terms of job creation and development of the local private sector. A more 
strategic objective is to protect local infant industries while they develop the capabilities 
necessary to compete internationally and to participate in GVC. Particularly interesting 
for capturing greater shares of the value-added is to focus on industries participating in 
the stages of the production chain that have a higher technological content (Johnson, 
2013; Pérez, 2013).  
Elms & Low (2013) provide an overview of industrial policies showing that 
LCR have significant importance in emerging economies. LCR are also increasingly 
being used by countries with different levels of economic development to make green 
growth strategies politically acceptable. For example, many countries have used LCR as 
part of renewable energy support schemes: China, Brazil, Quebec (Canada) and Chubut 
(Argentina) for wind power; India, Brazil, Italy and France for solar power; Ontario 
(Canada), Montana and Louisiana (USA) for biofuels; Croatia, South Africa, Turkey 
and several areas of Spain (Galicia, Navarra, Castilla y León and Valencia) and of the 
USA (California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio and Washington) for renewable 
energy in general (Johnson, 2013; Kuntze and Moerenhout, 2012). 
LCR are explicitly prohibited under the WTO, which considers them 
inconsistent with a free and fair international trade regime. However, many WTO 
member states use LCR, something that has given rise to numerous disputes in the last 
decades. Some examples related to climate policy are the complaint by Japan against 
Ontario's LCR provisions in the feed-in tariff scheme, and the dispute by China against 
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certain EU member states regarding LCR in renewable energy policies (Johnson, 2013; 
Kuntze and Moerenhout, 2012). 
Kuntze & Moerenhout (2012) explain that, although LCR may increase costs to 
the industry and consumers in the short term, in the medium term and under certain 
conditions, LCR may facilitate the creation of competitive and innovative industries 
domestically, decreasing the global costs of technology. Experiences in emerging 
countries evidence the potential of LCR to successfully promote green industries and 
build new clean-technology value chains (Mathews, 2015). Given this medium term 
benefits, it seems plausible that LCR are imposed as a precondition to the receipt of 
financial support for climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
In the case of the recipient countries considered in this article, namely China, 
Brazil, India, Indonesia and Mexico, there are evidences of the use of LCR for the 
development of several industries, including some clean energy technologies. In Brazil, 
LCR have reduced the propensity to import from foreign companies and successfully 
facilitated the development of competitive industries (Pérez, 2013). The strategy 
consisted in attaching LCR to development bank financing for project developers, 
introducing LCR in public support programmes (e.g. in the automotive industry and in 
the electronics sector), tying them to fiscal benefits, and using the influence of powerful 
public companies to introduce LCR (Elms and Low, 2013; Pérez, 2013). This way, 
Brazil has also been able to build up competitive solar and wind power industries 
(Johnson, 2013; Kuntze and Moerenhout, 2012; Mathews, 2015).  
In China, the use of LCR since 1996 has also been the key to the creation of a 
powerful wind industry. In 2009, after the complaints at the WTO by the USA, LCR 
were abolished at the introduction of countrywide feed-in tariffs. However, the period 
1996-2009 was enough for the building of a globally competitive renewable energy 
industry (ibid). 
In India the use of LCR as a tool for domestic industry development in the 
automotive industry has improved the bargaining power of local firms and influenced 
the value distribution in these GVC. India aims to achieve the same result for the 
renewable energy local industry, despite the attempts to obstruct this ambition by trade 
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actions brought to the WTO by the USA. The Solar National Solar Mission of 2009 and 
the Indian Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission of 2010 contain LCR for solar 
projects. India was also using LCR in the manufacturing of electric vehicles until 2012 
(Elms and Low, 2013; Johnson, 2013; Kuntze and Moerenhout, 2012; Mathews, 2015).  
Mexico and Indonesia have also used LCR mainly in the extractive and 
automotive sectors (Elms and Low, 2013; Kuntze and Moerenhout, 2012). 
4.3. Methods and data 
The Leontief IO model is a much extended tool for the assessment of the economic 
impact of policy interventions, concrete projects and events. Its interest for our purpose 
lies in its ability to capture direct and indirect impacts, and differentiate the part of the 
impact happening in a different place from where interventions take place (i.e. spill-over 
effects). Using this methodology, Beutel (2002) found that spill-over effects of 
European Structural Funds represented 20-30% of the total impact. However, the single-
country IO framework used in this study did not enable to distinguish the countries 
benefitting from these spill-overs.  
For that purpose a GMRIO framework is required. GMRIO databases contain, 
for a number of industries in different countries, the monetary value of transactions with 
other (national and foreign) industries, sales to (national or foreign) final users, 
remuneration of primary inputs and total output (Miller and Blair, 2009). GMRIO 
models are being increasingly used in the literature on GVC (Johnson and Noguera, 
2012; Koopman et al., 2014, 2012; Los et al., 2015). Spill-overs, in particular, have 
been previously tackled in the study of the cross-border effects of trade (Arto et al., 
2015). In the field of climate policy, the recent paper by Markandya et al. (2016) tracks 
the domestic and cross-border employment effects associated to the energy transition in 
the EU. The GMRIO framework also enables to quantify the contribution of each 
industry and country to the value-added embodied in goods and services. In Chapter 2, 
we used this method to provide a clear picture of the final destination of the financial 
resources transferred as climate finance, by tracing the value-added creation associated 
to climate investments. 
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The objective of this chapter is to calculate the spill-over effects in terms of 
value-added generated by climate finance on donor countries, depending on the 
conditions imposed on the use of the transferred resources and, in doing so, we will use 
the so-called WIOD. The WIOD provides multiregional IO tables (i.e. the WIOT) 
containing 35 sectors of 41 regions for the period 1995-2011 (Dietzenbacher et al., 
2013b; Timmer et al., 2012). As we have already mentioned in the introduction, due to 
data availability we will not consider every single donor and recipient country, but we 
will focus on a particular set of countries. As donor countries we will consider 
Germany, UK, Japan and USA. These are the climate finance donors from which 
previous studies exist about the practice of tying climate aid (Whitley, 2012; Whitley et 
al., 2012; Whitley and Mohanty, 2013, 2012), and together represent 62% of the climate 
finance pledged as for October 2016 (Climate Funds Update, 2016). As climate finance 
recipient countries, we will focus on Brazil, China, Indonesia, India and Mexico. These 
countries are the five main climate finance recipient countries (accounting for 16% of 
the total funding approved as for October 2016) (ibid). The year of study is the most 
recent one available in the database (i.e. 2011). 
Along with GMRIO tables, data on climate finance disbursements is also 
required to characterize the demand shocks produced by climate finance in the recipient 
economy. Different types of climate actions entail different demand shocks in terms of 
the goods and services required for their implementation and their associated costs. We 
combine different classifications of mitigation and adaptation measures from the 
literature (Blazejczak et al., 2014; Buchner et al., 2013; OECD/IEA, 2014; Prowse and 
Snilstveit, 2010; REN21, 2014, p. 21; UNFCCC, 2014b) and obtain a set of measures 
representing the whole spectrum of climate action. Table 12 in the Appendix (Section 
4.7.1) contains a list with the 26 climate action types considered, including 14 
renewable energy technologies, three energy efficiency measures and nine adaptation 
alternatives. For each of these types of climate action, the typical cost breakdown is 
estimated using different sources of information, which are also detailed in Table 12. 
The information used for the characterization of the demand shocks of renewable 
energy technologies is based on empirical data from a comprehensive survey 
undertaken in Germany in 2011 by the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 
(DIW Berlin), and has been used in previous studies (Lehr et al., 2012, 2008). There are 
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also other studies that provide information about the typical cost breakdown of ocean 
energy and other mitigation actions (Allan et al., 2008; Markaki et al., 2013). Finally, 
the demand shocks of the different types of climate change adaptation are estimated 
with information contained in Priority Project Profile documents of NAPA (UNFCCC, 
2014b). In order to connect this information with the GMRIO framework, demand 
shocks are expressed in terms of industries following the NACE classification. This is 
done following the correspondence between commodities and industries detailed in 
Table 10 of Chapter 3 for the cases where the source of information refers to 
commodities in the budget allocation.  
The demand shocks obtained represent the new requirements of production for 
different industries that a particular climate action entails. The next step is to allocate 
the new demands to specific countries. In order to reflect conditions on the spending of 
climate finance (i.e. tied aid or LCR), three scenarios are considered.  
- First, a baseline scenario, representing a situation without conditions, is used as 
reference for comparison with the other two scenarios. In this case, trade 
structure vectors are computed with information from the WIOT, reflecting the 
actual flows of international trade as for 2011. This scenario reflects the status 
quo of tied aid and LCR practices. Trade structure vectors contain the share of 
final demand for one industry in one country that is satisfied with domestic 
production, along with the share satisfied with production from each of the rest 
of the countries.  
- Second, the tied aid scenario is based on the baseline scenario but substituting 
imports from third countries by imports from the donor country (and the share of 
the demand satisfied with domestic production remains as in the baseline). This 
way, this scenario represents a hypothetical situation in which each donor 
imposes as condition for its support to be the supplier of the goods and services 
required for the financed climate actions that recipient countries need to import.  
- Finally, the LCR scenario consists in substituting all imports with domestic 
products. This would represent the hypothetical and extreme case in which 
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climate finance recipient countries impose a 100% LCR as condition for hosting 
internationally funded climate actions38.  
Having allocated the new demand to producing countries, the next step is to 
quantify total output requirements associated to this new demand. The production of 
additional demand, in turn, generates new requirements of intermediate goods/services, 
giving rise to a sequence of additional requirements amongst industries (or production 
multiplier effect). The total output requirements are condensed in the Leontief inverse 
matrix, which is calculated with information from the WIOT. Next, in order to 
determine the contribution of each industry and country to the value-added embedded in 
these total output requirements, we used information from the WIOT to calculate value-
added coefficients, which express the value-added per unit of output in each sector and 
country.  
At this point, we have all the elements to compute the impact in terms of value-
added in each donor country associated to the implementation of each climate action in 
each host country, and depending on the scenario. The Appendix (Section 4.7.2) 
provides formal details of the calculations.  
Finally, in order to facilitate the interpretation and exposition of the results, we 
group the 26 climate actions into five groups, and use group averages in the presentation 
of results. Groups are formed using a cluster analysis based on the k-means method 
(Tan et al., 2013). This non-hierarchic method allocates each element (in this case, each 
climate action) to one of the k groups (in this case, five groups). The optimization 
procedure consists in minimizing the aggregation of Euclidean distances between the 
elements and the group centroids. This equates to minimizing the aggregation of intra-
group variances of all variables (in our case, the industries of the economy). Each of the 
resulting groups contains climate actions with similar cost structures, and represents a 
particular way to impact the economy with additional demands of goods and services.  
Table 11 shows the clustering of the 26 climate actions into five groups, and 
Figure 12 illustrates the average cost structure (i.e. distribution of the budget between 
                                               
38 In the practice, LCR range from 15% to 100%, according to Qiu and Tao (2001). We choose the more 
extreme case in order to offer an upper bound estimate of the effects of LCR. 
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the different economic sectors) of each group. Figure 20 in the Appendix (Section 
4.7.1) completes this information with the cost structures of all 26 climate actions.  
Table 11. Grouping of climate actions 
Group 
1 
Renewable energy in transport (biofuels) 
Group 
5 
Onshore wind power 
Group 
2 
Building insulation Solar thermal energy 
Biomass energy large scale Hydropower 
Group 
3 
Offshore wind power Biomass energy small scale 
Photovoltaics Biogas power 
Infrastructures for transport Deep geothermal energy 
Group 
4 
Concentrated solar power Surface geothermal power 
Coastal protection Ocean power 
Disaster risk reduction Energy efficiency in industry 
Social protection 
Renewable energy and energy efficiency in 
buildings 
Forestry and land use/ Terrestrial Ecosystems Water supply and management 
Capacity building 
Human settlements, infrastructure and spatial 
planning 
Agriculture; fishing and livestock Waste and wastewater 
Source: Own work. 
Group 1 comprises only one climate action: renewable energy in transport 
(biofuels). This action forms a group by itself given the large share (60%) of expenses 
in agricultural products, something that substantially differs from the rest of climate 
actions. Another singularity is that another portion of the cost (9%) consists of products 
of the food industry. Group 2 comprises two actions: building insulation and biomass 
energy at large scale, which entail expenses in construction accounting for 80% of the 
total costs. This high content of construction is the main singularity of this group. Group 
3 comprises three actions (two renewable energy technologies and one for transport) 
requiring expenses mainly in construction and transport equipment. The portion 
represented by transport equipment (23%) may be the distinctive feature of this group. 
Group 4 comprises seven climate actions, mainly related to adaptation (with the 
exception of one renewable energy technology: CSP) and with the common 
characteristic of requiring important expenses in OBA (47% of the total costs). Finally, 
group 5 comprises the most numerous and varied set of climate actions, including most 
renewable energy technologies but also some energy efficiency and adaptation actions. 
Consequently, the average cost structure is characterized by a rather equilibrated 
96  
 
distribution of the budget between different industries (constructions, OBA, electrical 
and optical equipment, metals…), amongst which, the one with the largest share is 
machinery (26%).  
Figure 12. Average cost structure by climate action groups 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: OBA (Other business activities), Electr. Eq. (Electrical and Optical 
equipment), Transp. Eq. (Transport equipment). 
4.4. Results 
In this section we will summarize the main results of the scenario analysis regarding the 
size of the spill-overs in terms of value-added of climate finance on donor countries, 
which depends on three factors: 1) the action in which climate finance is employed; 2) 
the country hosting the climate action; and 3) the scenario. The exposition is firstly 
centred on the impact at country level. These overall results are then linked to the most 
influential industries in each case, using the results disaggregated at sectoral level. 
4.4.1. Country level 
Figure 13 shows the spill-overs captured by each donor country depending on the host 
country for the three scenarios. It shows that, for example, out of every USD 100 spent 
on climate actions in Mexico, assuming that international trade was as in 2011 (i.e. 
baseline scenario), USD 14 would end up in the USA, as a result of requirements of 
goods and services produced in the USA for undertaking the climate actions. If the USA 
were the donor, and the aid was granted with the condition that required imports would 
come from the USA (i.e. tied aid scenario), then the USA would capture USD 24, 
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instead of USD 14. If, contrarily, Mexico imposed as precondition for the receipt of aid, 
that all suppliers would be Mexican, then the USA would capture only nine dollars 
through the imports of intermediate inputs by Mexican industries.  
Figure 13. Spill-overs by recipient country and scenario 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), IDN Indonesia), IND (India), MEX 
(Mexico). 
As expected, the lowest spill-overs correspond to the LCR scenario, and the 
highest ones to the tied aid scenario, while spill-overs of the baseline scenario lie 
between these two extremes. Note that the USA is the donor capturing the largest spill-
overs in all scenarios (an average of 7%), followed by Japan (5%) and Germany (4%). 
The UK is the donor with the smallest spill-overs independently of the scenario (3%). In 
some cases spill-overs differ depending on the host country. In the baseline and LCR 
scenarios, Germany and the UK capture similar spill-overs from all host countries 
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(between 0% - 2%). Japan captures relatively large spill-overs from Indonesia (2% - 
4%) and the USA captures large spill-overs from Mexico (9% - 14%).  
On the one hand, the tied aid scenario leads to higher levels of spill-overs 
captured by donors than those of the baseline scenario. The increase of spill-overs 
captured by donor countries ranges from 4 to 17 pp, with an average increase of 8.4 pp. 
The tied aid especially increases spill-overs produced by climate finance disbursed in 
Mexico and Indonesia. These two countries become the host countries producing largest 
spill-overs for all donors in this scenario. Thus, Japan would capture 17 pp more from 
Mexico, the UK and Germany 15 pp and 14 pp more (respectively) also from Mexico, 
and the USA 12 pp more from Indonesia. On the other hand, the LCR scenario would 
produce relatively unimportant differences for all donors (less than 0.9 pp) except in the 
case of the USA, where spill-overs from Mexico are reduced 5 pp. The LCR scenario 
reduces the differences in the spill-overs obtained with different countries (standard 
deviations are reduced an average of 0.6 pp), whereas the tied aid scenario accentuates 
these differences (an average increase of standard deviations of 3.4 pp). 
Figure 14 contains the spill-overs captured by each donor country depending 
on the climate action group for the three scenarios. It shows that the tied aid scenario 
produces a large increase in spill-overs for all donors independently of the climate 
actions implemented. Certain types of climate actions generate larger spill-overs than 
others. Groups 5 and 3, including climate actions that intensively use machinery and 
equipment, stand out as the ones generating the largest spill-over effects. The tied aid 
scenario increases especially spill-overs from group 5, producing an increase of 14 pp 
on average. Japan is the country experiencing the largest increase (15 pp), then the UK 
(14 pp), and finally Germany and the USA (13 pp, each). Groups 1 and 2, representing 
actions that intensively use goods from the agriculture and construction sectors, are the 
groups that produce the lowest spill-overs in the baseline scenario. Again, the LCR 
scenario reduces the differences in the spill-overs obtained with different climate 
actions groups, whereas the tied aid scenario accentuates them (standard deviations 
changes are -0.3 and +3.2 pp, respectively). The largest decrease produced by the LCR 
scenario is in spill-overs to the USA in climate actions of group 5 (3 pp). 
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Figure 14. Spill-overs by climate action groups and scenario 
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Source: Own work.  
The best combinations of host country and climate action, in terms of the size 
of the spill-overs captured by donors, vary depending on the scenario. Table 13 in the 
Appendix (Section 4.7.1) contains the five combinations producing the largest spill-
overs for each donor and scenario. 
In the case of Germany, the best options in the baseline scenario include 
actions of groups 3 and 5 in different host countries (Mexico, China, Indonesia and 
Brazil), producing an average spill-over of 2.6%. In the tied aid scenario the best 
options consist on a larger set of climate actions (from groups 1, 3, 4 and 5) especially 
in Mexico (but also in Indonesia), with an average spill-over of 19%. In the LCR 
scenario, the best five combinations are actions of groups 3 and 5 in Mexico, China or 
Indonesia (Brazil disappears from the best options) with an average spill-over of 1.2%.  
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The case of the UK is similar to that of Germany. In the baseline, actions of 
groups 3 and 5 in a wide set of host countries (China, Indonesia, Mexico and India) are 
the best combinations, with spill-overs of 0.7% in average. In the tied aid scenario, the 
largest spill-overs (18.6% in average) come from a wide range of actions (from groups 
1, 3, 4 and 5) in Mexico and Indonesia. In the LCR scenario the best options, with spill-
overs of 0.4% in average, involve actions of groups 3 and 5 especially in India, but also 
in Mexico and Indonesia (China disappears from the best options).  
For Japan, combinations producing the highest spill-overs in the baseline 
scenario (3.9% in average) are concentrated in two countries (Indonesia and China) and 
mainly in two groups of actions (3 and 5, although group 2 also appears). In the tied aid 
scenario, Mexico replaces China, and a wider set of actions (from groups 1, 2, 4 and 5) 
in Indonesia and Mexico are the best combinations (generating spill-overs of 22.4% on 
average). The set of best combinations for Japan for the LCR scenario remains the same 
as in the baseline. 
In the case of the USA the set of best options does not change qualitatively 
with different scenarios. The best options involve any type of action in Mexico. 
Nevertheless, the size of the spill-overs produced by this set of combinations changes 
from an average of 14% in the baseline scenario to 26% in the scenario with tied aid, 
and to 8.8% with LCR. 
4.4.2. Industry level 
Figure 15 shows the three industries capturing the largest shares of spill-over effects in 
each donor country and scenario. It also informs about the type of climate action and the 
host country producing the spill-overs in each case.  
In the baseline scenario, the German industries that receive the largest spill-
overs (around 1%) are machinery (especially due to actions of groups 5), OBA 
(especially due to actions implemented in China) and metals (especially due to actions 
undertaken in Mexico). In the tied aid scenario, the machinery and OBA industries 
continue being amongst the most benefitted by spill-overs, which this time are close to 
10%.  
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Figure 15. Spill-overs by donor, scenario, action group and recipient country 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX 
(Mexico), OBA (other business activities), Electr. Eq. (electrical and optical equipment); 
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The German machinery industry benefits from actions of groups 1 and 5, 
especially in Mexico and Indonesia. OBA’s spill-overs are originated in actions of 
groups 3, 4 and 5 implemented in Indonesia, China and Mexico. In this scenario, the 
German agriculture sector is the third most benefitted (instead of the metals industry), 
due to actions of group 1 in Mexico, Indonesia and Brazil. The results of the LCR 
scenario are very similar to those obtained in the baseline scenario. 
The results for British industries resemble those obtained for German ones, 
with slight differences. In the baseline scenario, the largest spill-over effects are around 
0.2% and take place, along with the machinery and OBA sectors, in the sector of 
financial intermediation (especially due to actions implemented in India). In the LCR 
scenario, the main beneficiaries of the rather small spill-over effects (0.1%) are the 
metals industry (from India), OBA (from Mexico and China) and the financial 
intermediation (from India). 
The Japanese industries that benefit most from spill-overs (around 1.5%) in the 
baseline scenario are the machinery and metals sectors (due to actions in Indonesia) and 
the industry of electronic equipment (especially from actions in China). In the tied aid 
scenario, the largest spill-overs (8.7%) are captured by the machinery and metals sector 
(this time due to actions in Mexico and China), and also by the agriculture sector 
(associated to actions of group 1). The results of the LCR scenario are very similar to 
those obtained in the baseline scenario. 
American industries capturing the largest spill-overs (approx. 5%) in the 
baseline scenario are machinery, OBA and agriculture (especially due to actions 
undertaken in Mexico). In the tied aid scenario the largest spill-overs are captured by 
the same set of industries, although the size of the spill-over effects doubles and it 
involves actions not only in Mexico but also in Indonesia. In the LCR scenario, the 
largest spill-overs (1.3%) are captured by OBA, agriculture and the chemical industry 
from actions in Mexico.  
We have observed that in all cases (for all donors) the most affected industry, 
both by tied aid and LCR, is machinery. Tied aid increases spill-overs captured by 
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donors’ machinery industry 2.19 pp on average, while LCR reduce them 0.3 pp on 
average. 
4.5. Discussion 
According to the results presented in the previous section, the spill-overs resulting from 
the baseline scenario differ between donors. Figure 16, illustrating the trade shares of 
each donor in each recipient country for the different sectors of the economy, clearly 
shows that the USA is a prominent provider in many sectors for recipient countries, 
compared with other donors. In most manufacturing sectors, Japan and Germany also 
produce significant shares of the recipient countries’ imports. In the light of this 
information, it is easy to see that if the UK is the donor with the smallest spill-overs this 
is, in part, due to the limited share that the UK final goods and services represent on 
these countries’ purchases. It is also worth noting that in the case of the USA, the 
largest trade shares are in Mexico, and in the case of Japan, in Indonesia and China. 
This suggests that the geographic proximity is relevant for trade linkages between 
countries.  
Besides, the average of trade shares (grey line in Figure 16) shows that the 
industries where donors have the largest portions of sales of final products to recipient 
countries are the machinery and electrical and transport equipment industries. This 
explains why groups 3 and 5 are those producing the largest spill-overs. These groups 
comprise climate actions related to the deployment of renewable energy and the 
construction of infrastructures for energy efficiency, water and waste management, with 
substantial requirements of machinery and equipment. The high dependence of recipient 
countries on international trade for these types of products would also explain that spill-
overs from these industries are especially sensitive to both tied aid and LCR conditions.  
Figure 16 also shows that agriculture, food and construction are among the 
economic activities with the lowest penetration of donors’ exports. Figure 17, 
representing the share of the final demand that is domestically produced in each 
recipient country by industry, confirms the relevance of local production in these 
sectors. This would also explain that spill-overs resulting from climate actions with 
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intensive use of agricultural products and construction services, like those clustered in 
the first two groups, are small. 
Figure 16. Trade shares in recipient countries by donors’ industries 
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Source: Own work based on WIOD. Abbreviations: DEU (Germany), UK (United Kingdom), JPN 
(Japan), USA (United States of America), BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), 
MEX (Mexico), Electr. Eq. (electrical and optical equipment), Transp. Eq. (transport equipment), EGW 
(electricity, gas and water supply), W. Trade (wholesale trade), R. Trade (retail trade), I. Transport 
(inland transport), W. Transport (water transport), A. Transport (air transport), ATA (auxiliary transport 
activities), OBA (other business activities), PP.AA. (Public Administrations), Personal Serv. (personal 
services). 
According to sectoral results of the baseline scenario, donors’ industries with 
the lowest penetration rates in the recipient countries (like metals, financial 
intermediation, OBA and agriculture) also capture spill-overs. We might find an 
explanation for this in Figure 18, which contains production multipliers. These 
multipliers reflect the magnitude of indirect effects on donors’ industries via the 
purchases of intermediate inputs by host countries’ industries. Indirect effects enable 
industries not directly involved in the supply of final goods and services for the funded 
actions to participate in the associated economic benefits through their contribution to 
the value chain of industries directly involved. Moreover, financial intermediation, 
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OBA and agriculture in donor countries are also characterized by high value-added 
intensity (see Figure 19), something that contributes to explain spill-overs captured by 
these sectors. 
Figure 17. Share of domestic production in recipient countries by industry  
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Source: Own work based on WIOD. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), IDN (Indonesia), IND 
(India), MEX (Mexico), Electr. Eq. (electrical and optical equipment), Transp. Eq. (transport equipment), 
EGW (electricity, gas and water supply), W. Trade (wholesale trade), R. Trade (retail trade), I. Transport 
(inland transport), W. Transport (water transport), A. Transport (air transport), ATA (auxiliary transport 
activities), OBA (other business activities), PP.AA. (Public Administrations), Personal Serv. (personal 
services). 
Coming back to Figure 17, we see that Indonesia and Mexico are the countries 
where, being the local production more limited, imports represent a large share of the 
total demand. This explains why, in a scenario with tied aid (i.e. donors supplying all 
imports), spill-overs from these countries increase specially (something that puts them 
in the first positions amongst donors’ best options in the tied aid scenario). 
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Figure 18. Indirect effects in donors’ industries by recipient country  
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Source: Own work based on WIOD. Abbreviations: DEU (Germany), UK (United Kingdom), JPN 
(Japan), USA (United States of America), BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), 
MEX (Mexico), Electr. Eq. (electrical and optical equipment), Transp. Eq. (transport equipment), EGW 
(electricity, gas and water supply), W. Trade (wholesale trade), R. Trade (retail trade), I. Transport 
(inland transport), W. Transport (water transport), A. Transport (air transport), ATA (auxiliary transport 
activities), OBA (other business activities), PP.AA. (Public Administrations), Personal Serv. (personal 
services). 
Similarly, the machinery and equipment (electrical and transport) industries 
have on average low shares of domestic production. Again, this might explain why the 
tied aid scenario produces especially large spill-overs in the case of climate actions of 
groups 3 and 5 (where these industries represent a relevant share of the expenses). 
However, the fact that tied aid increases particularly spill-overs for the USA and Japan 
cannot be explained by trade shares on final products since, by definition, all donors 
would have the same trade shares in the tied aid scenario. We find an explanation in 
Figure 18: the high multiplier effects on Japanese and USA industries, compared with 
other donor countries. The fact that tying aid increases spill-overs captured by the 
agricultural sector in all the donors seems to be related to the high value-added intensity 
of this sector in donor countries (see Figure 19). 
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Figure 19. Value-added intensity in donors’ industries 
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Source: Own work based on WIOD. Abbreviations: DEU (Germany), UK (United Kingdom), JPN 
(Japan), USA (United States of America), Electr. Eq. (electrical and optical equipment), Transp. Eq. 
(transport equipment), EGW (electricity, gas and water supply), W. Trade (wholesale trade), R. Trade 
(retail trade), I. Transport (inland transport), W. Transport (water transport), A. Transport (air transport), 
ATA (auxiliary transport activities), OBA (other business activities), PP.AA. (Public Administrations), 
Personal Serv. (Personal services). 
With 100% of LCR, spill-overs are limited to impacts produced indirectly, in 
the second and subsequent rounds of purchases between industries. They are, therefore, 
related to international trade of intermediate inputs. As already mentioned, Figure 18 
depicts the indirect effects triggered by expenditure in recipient countries. The average 
values show that some sectors producing intermediate goods and services for other 
industries (like chemicals, metals, electrical equipment, financial intermediation and 
OBA) are those that receive the largest indirect impacts via the imports of recipient 
countries’ industries. This is in line with the sectoral results of the LCR scenario. This 
scenario results detrimental for the machinery industry of donor countries, being its 
impacts reduced from the current large direct impacts (via exports of final products) to 
more limited indirect impacts (via purchases of intermediate inputs by local industries). 
However, spill-overs in this scenario are not negligible for some combinations of donors 
and recipient countries, like the USA-Mexico (9%), USA-China (2%), Japan-Indonesia 
and Japan-China (both 2%). All these combinations are associated to high indirect 
effects (as depicted in Figure 18). 
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4.6. Conclusion 
According to our estimates, tied aid would substantially increase donors’ share of spill-
overs: from 4 to 17 pp, with an average increase of 8.4 pp. The industry of machinery, 
very relevant for the deployment of renewable energy technologies, is especially 
sensitive to the tied aid scenario with spill-overs going from around 1% to close to 10%. 
Thus, with tied aid, the penetration of products from donor countries would augment 
specially in sectors related to mitigation. Also, those destinations more dependent on 
international supplies to satisfy their final demand are especially sensitive to the tied aid 
scenario (spill-overs from Mexico and Indonesia increase around 10 pp with tied aid). 
Tied aid accentuates the differences between alternative locations and climate actions 
regarding their potential to generate spill-overs for donors, something that increases the 
incentives to maintain the current concentration of disbursements (on mitigation 
projects in few countries) reported by OECD (OECD and CPI, 2015). 
Given the incentives to tie aid, and since bilateral channels facilitate this 
practice, the type of channel chosen to deliver the funds becomes thus an important 
factor in the discussion. Multilateral funds are less susceptible to be used by donors to 
promote their exports. Some multilateral agencies, like the World Bank’s Climate 
Investment Funds, enable donors to earmark their contributions to objectives aligned 
with their interests, but not to tie aid directly. In the case of the GCF, donors cannot 
even earmark their contributions. Having GCF financing decisions to be agreed by 
representatives of developing and developed countries (equal in number and by 
consensus) is a good safeguard to avoid temptation of tying aid. Thus, as far as 
contributions towards the USD 100 billion goal are channelled through the GCF or 
similar multilateral funds, tied aid becomes less probable. Ultimately this means that the 
magnitude of spill-overs would be limited, and a larger share of the aid’s positive 
economic impact will remain in recipient countries. This becomes more important given 
the increasing relevance of new donors which have openly adopted the practice of tying 
aid. 
In this study emerging countries are considered as net recipients of climate aid, 
when in fact, they are also becoming relevant donors. These new donors are also 
adopting the practice of tying aid. China provides concessional loans to states aligned 
The Economics of Climate Finance 109 
 
with the purpose of stimulating exports of Chinese mechanical and electrical products. 
These loans are tied to the requirement that at least 50% of the total amount of the loan 
is spent in Chinese materials, techniques and services. India refuses to accept tied aid 
but much of the development aid India offers to other countries is tied, with a 
substantial part spent in India. Its aid policy is motivated not only by altruism but also 
by economic benefits (Ahmad, 2011). Thus, it would be interesting to analyse the 
implications of the three analysed scenarios in the case of South-to-South climate 
cooperation.  
On the other hand, LCR do not seem to have a relevant impact on donors’ spill-
overs. These would decrease less than 0.9 pp on average. LCR affect especially the 
machinery industry of donor countries. Nevertheless, donor countries participating in 
GVC are still able to capture a share of the economic benefits of climate action in 
developing countries via international trade of intermediate inputs. This suggests that, in 
the absence of other issues, the chances that donors would avoid recipient countries that 
impose LCR are relatively low. Besides, LCR would reduce the incentive to concentrate 
finance on mitigation as a way to increase sales of export-oriented sectors, since with 
LCR spill-overs are rather indirectly captured and also from sectors contributing to 
tackle adaptation needs.  
This type of policy may contribute to increase the impact of climate finance in 
the short run and to generate (green) industrial activity in the recipient country, but it 
might not suffice to developing globally competitive industries. LCR cannot avoid spill-
overs from indirect effects via trade in intermediate inputs and tasks. Thus, industrial 
development policies have to put attention on intermediate goods producers, and focus 
in a specialization on high value-added tasks. 
Note that the employed methodology entails several limitations. First of all, the 
limitations derived from the IO model assumptions: constant returns to scale, linear 
production function, lack of substitution possibilities, homogeneity of input factors, 
underutilization of the economy and constancy of input coefficients over time. These 
assumptions imply that the economies can expand without putting pressure on prices 
and wages, that technology does not change and that the different activities within a 
certain sector are equal (Madlener and Koller, 2007). Hence, this methodology is only 
110  
 
appropriate to assess interventions in the medium term that, because of their limited 
dimension relative to the economy size, would not affect factors availability and prices 
(as it is our case). Second, the WIOD has its own weaknesses related to measurement 
issues regarding imports by use category, trade in services and intangibles, exports and 
imports for processing, among others (Timmer et al., 2015).  
Finally, there is uncertainty about how the different expenditures are allocated 
over the different sectors of the model, since the cost breakdown of climate actions can 
vary depending on the country and the specific purpose of the project. Despite these 
limitations, the approach used is a good and robust tool to calculate the spill-over effects 
associated to international trade. 
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4.7. Appendix 
4.7.1. Additional figures and tables 
Figure 20. Cost structure by group  
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: EGW (electricity, gas and water supply), Electr. Eq. (electrical and 
optical equipment), Agriculture. (agriculture,fishing and livestock), B_insulation (building insulation), 
B_EE_RE (renewable energy and energy efficiency in buildings), Biogas (biogas power), Biomass_big 
(biomass energy large scale), Biomass_small (biomass energy small scale), Capacity (capacity building), 
Coastal (coastal protection), CSP (concentrated solar power), DRR (disaster risk reduction), Forest 
(forestry and land use/ terrestrial Ecosystems), Geo_deep (deep geothermal energy), Geo_surface (surface 
geothermal power), Hydro (hydropower), Industry (energy efficiency in industry), Infrastr (human 
settlements, infrastructure and spatial planning), Ocean (ocean power), Social P. (social protection), Solar 
PV (photovoltaics), Solar_thermal (solar thermal energy), T_infrastr (infrastructures for transport), T_RE 
(renewable energy in transport, biofuels), Waste (waste and wastewater), Water (water supply and 
management), Wind_off (offshore wind power), Wind_on (onshore wind power). 
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Figure 20. Cost structure by group (cont.) 
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Source: Own work. Abbreviations: EGW (electricity, gas and water supply), Electr. Eq. (electrical and 
optical equipment), Agriculture. (agriculture,fishing and livestock), B_insulation (building insulation), 
B_EE_RE (renewable energy and energy efficiency in buildings), Biogas (biogas power), Biomass_big 
(biomass energy large scale), Biomass_small (biomass energy small scale), Capacity (capacity building), 
Coastal (coastal protection), CSP (concentrated solar power), DRR (disaster risk reduction), Forest 
(forestry and land use/ terrestrial Ecosystems), Geo_deep (deep geothermal energy), Geo_surface (surface 
geothermal power), Hydro (hydropower), Industry (energy efficiency in industry), Infrastr (human 
settlements, infrastructure and spatial planning), Ocean (ocean power), Social P. (social protection), Solar 
PV (photovoltaics), Solar_thermal (solar thermal energy), T_infrastr (infrastructures for transport), T_RE 
(renewable energy in transport, biofuels), Waste (waste and wastewater), Water (water supply and 
management), Wind_off (offshore wind power), Wind_on (onshore wind power). 
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Table 12. Climate actions and sources of information 
Type and abbreviation Source 
Onshore wind power (Wind_on); Offshore wind power 
(Wind_off); Photovoltaics (Solar PV); Solar thermal 
energy (Solar_thermal); Hydropower (Hydro); Biomass 
energy large scale (Biomass_big); Biomass energy small 
scale (Biomass_small); Biogas power (Biogas); Deep 
geothermal energy (Geo_deep); Surface geothermal 
power (Geo_surface); Concentrated solar power (CSP) 
Lehr (2008,2012) 
Ocean power (Ocean) Allan et al., (2008) 
Renewable energy in transport (T_RE); Energy efficiency 
and renewable energy in buildings (B_EE_RE); 
Insulation of buildings (B_insulation); Energy efficiency 
in industry (Industry); Infrastructures for transport 
(T_infrastr)  
Markaki et al., (2013) 
Coastal protection (Coastal) NAPAs Gambia #9, Cape Verde #3, Sierre Leone #18 
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) NAPAs Gasmbia #1, Bhutan #5#7#9, Sierre Leone #2 
Water supply and management (Water) NAPAs Sudan #2, Sierre Leone #12, Tuvalu #3 
Human settlements, infrastructure and spatial planning 
(Infrastr) 
NAPAs Tanzania #5, Sierre Leone #8, Gambia #6, 
Maldives #10, Bhutan #6, Samoa #6, Maldives#8 
Social protection (Social P.) NAPAs Malawi #1, Lesotho #8, Sierre Leone #23 
Waste and wastewater (Waste) NAPAs Sierre Leone #22, Maldives #5 
Forestry and land use/ Terrestrial Ecosystems (Forest) 
NAPAs Eritrea #3, Lesotho #6, Tuvalu#5, Burundi #3, 
Bhutan #11 
Capacity-building (Capacity) NAPAs Burundi #11, Malawi #5, Sierre Leone #5 
Agriculture, fishing and livestock (Agriculture) NAPAs Sierre Leone #5#7, Eritrea #2, Maldives #9 
Source: Own work based on literature (Blazejczak et al., 2014; Buchner et al., 2013; OECD/IEA, 2014; 
Prowse and Snilstveit, 2010; REN21, 2014, p. 21; UNFCCC, 2014b)  
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Table 13. Top five options for each donor by scenario 
Baseline Tied aid LCRs 
Germany 
MEX5 2.94% MEX5 25.15% MEX3 1.36% 
CHN3 2.64% IDN5 22.15% MEX5 1.24% 
MEX3 2.59% MEX3 21.50% CHN3 1.23% 
IDN5 2.47% MEX1 13.64% IDN5 1.17% 
BRA5 2.44% MEX4 13.21% CHN5 1.15% 
UK 
CHN3 0.72% MEX5 24.50% IND2 0.55% 
IDN5 0.68% IDN5 21.62% IND3 0.49% 
MEX5 0.67% MEX3 20.64% IND5 0.47% 
IND5 0.65% MEX1 13.35% MEX3 0.35% 
IND3 0.61% MEX4 12.80% IDN5 0.34% 
Japan 
IDN5 5.48% MEX5 29.00% IDN5 2.82% 
IDN3 3.96% MEX3 26.11% IDN2 2.32% 
CHN3 3.41% IDN5 26.08% IDN3 2.28% 
CHN5 3.24% MEX1 15.44% CHN3 2.11% 
IDN2 3.20% MEX4 15.17% CHN5 1.93% 
USA 
MEX5 17.83% MEX5 33.52% MEX3 10.37% 
MEX3 17.00% MEX3 30.18% MEX5 9.60% 
MEX1 14.06% IDN5 25.86% MEX1 8.63% 
MEX2 10.84% MEX1 21.37% MEX2 8.28% 
MEX4 10.82% MEX4 19.60% MEX4 7.14% 
Source: Own work. Abbreviations: BRA (Brazil), CHN (China), IDN (Indonesia), IND (India), MEX 
(Mexico). 
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4.7.2. Methodology 
This appendix provides details about the quantification with GMRIO tables of spill-over 
effects on donor countries in terms of value-added. Similar methods have been 
previously used, for example, in Markandya et al. (2016). 
We start from the following information contained in GMRIO tables: rx is the 
column vector of gross outputs in country r. The inverse of the diagonal matrix of this 
vector is denoted as  
-1
ˆ rx . 
r
w  is a column vector of value-added in country r with 
elements 
r
iw  indicating the value-added created in each sector i of that country. With 
those elements, we calculate the column vector of value-added coefficients as 
 
-1
ˆ=r r rv x w . 
Moreover, rsZ is the matrix of intermediate inputs from country r to country s, 
with elements rsijz indicating the sales of sector i in country r to sector j in country s. We 
calculate the matrix of input coefficients as  
1
ˆrs rs s

A Z x and the Leontief inverse 
matrix as  
1
-

L I A  , where 
I is an identity matrix of the appropriate dimension. rsL  
contains production multipliers of country r associated with demand in country s. 
Next, 
stf  is the column vector with final demand, with elements stjf  indicating 
the final demand in country t for products of sector j produced by country s. We 
calculate the fraction of the total final demand in country t for commodities of sector j 
imported from country s (when s t ) or produced domestically (when s t ) as 
st
jst
j st
j
s
f
t
f


. The column vector 
stt indicates the trade structure of country t in the 
baseline scenario. For the construction of the other two scenarios, we substitute certain 
terms of this vector. We illustrate the procedure using an example with three countries, 
where 1 is the donor country, 2 is the recipient country and 3 is another country. Then, 
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Finally, we define ae  as the column vector of the demand shock, with elements 
a
je  indicating the proportion of expenditure on a specific climate action a spent in sector 
j. We assume that this expenditure by sector is expressed at basic prices, i.e. excluding 
taxes and transport and trade margins. With these elements we can calculate the value-
added created in the donor country r as a consequence of the implementation of climate 
action a in the recipient country t as w '
rta r rs st a
s
 v L t e , where  denotes the 
Hadamard product (i.e. the element by element multiplication).  
 
  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
118  
 
The Economics of Climate Finance 119 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In 2016, shortly before the 22nd COP in Marrakech, developed countries released the 
USD 100 billion goal roadmap for 2020 (UK Government and Australian Government, 
2016). According to this roadmap, the EU will transfer on average from 2014 to 2020 
more than USD 2 billion per year to developing countries. Within the EU, Germany and 
the UK have decided to double international support in 2020 compared to 2014. Japan 
also expects to mobilize more than USD 11 billion to support developing countries’ 
climate actions, including public and private sources of finance. The USA has promised 
to increase its annual transfers for adaptation projects in developing countries in more 
than USD 400 million. According to the OECD (2016), these commitments coupled 
with conservative estimates regarding private-public finance ratios, would be sufficient 
to meet the USD 100 billion goal.  
In this context of increasing North-to-South climate finance flows, the 
objective of this thesis has been to study the economic impact of the climate finance 
disbursements associated to mitigation and adaptation actions, not only in the countries 
hosting the actions but also in the rest of the world. In other words, we have performed 
an economic impact assessment of climate finance disbursements at a global level. This 
chapter summarizes the main findings, policy implications and conclusions of this 
assessment and indicates possible extensions for future research.  
5.2. Summary of findings 
5.2.1. International trade redistributes one share of the economic impact of 
climate finance away from recipient countries. 
The analysis in this thesis has permitted to focus on the economic benefits associated to 
climate finance disbursements, showing that international trade determines the 
distribution of these benefits between the recipient country and the rest of the world. 
Results confirm that only one part of the total disbursement of climate finance remains 
in the recipient country as remuneration of domestic labour and capital directly or 
indirectly employed in the implementation of climate actions. The remaining share of 
the disbursement corresponds to the compensation of foreign production factors that 
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also participate in the fabrication of the products needed for the deployment of climate 
actions. This share constitutes the spill-over effect of climate finance. 
The three research questions that were posed in Chapter 2, were the following: 
(i) How are the economic impacts of climate actions distributed between countries? (ii) 
How much of the impact spills over to non-recipient countries? And, (iii) how much 
impact is captured by each donor country?  
Regarding the first two questions, the analysis finds that on average 71% of the 
impact remains in the recipient country and 29% spills over to other countries. 
Nevertheless, the geographic distribution of the economic impact of climate finance and 
the volume of spill-overs varies depending on the country receiving the disbursement. 
Domestic impacts range from 61% to 80% and spill-overs from 20% to 39%. Figure 3 
in Chapter 2 illustrates the resulting distribution of the economic benefits for each 
recipient country considered. India and Brazil are the recipient countries with the largest 
shares of local impact, approaching 80%. Even for the same recipient country, the 
geographic distribution and the magnitude of spill-overs can be very different 
depending on the type of climate action implemented. Certain types of actions have 
greater local impact than others. In particular, adaptation and energy efficiency 
measures, which require significant services from the domestic construction sector, are 
those that result in the greatest local impact. Other actions such as the deployment of 
renewable energy sources are dependent on imported machinery and equipment and, 
consequently, generate large spill-overs.  
With regard to the third question, the analysis shows that spill-overs captured 
by donor countries range from 10% to 28%, depending on the donor country, on the 
climate action implemented and on the country receiving the funds. On average, the EU 
is the donor that benefits most from international spill-overs (6.8%). These results can 
be used to rank the combinations of locations and climate actions based on their 
potential to generate spill-overs for each donor country.  
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5.2.2. The relevance of each of the factors determining the size of the 
economic impact of climate finance varies with the country. 
Since both the magnitude of the local impact on developing countries and the volume of 
spill-overs captured by developed countries vary widely, depending on the specific 
country observed, Chapter 3 tries to bring to light the relative importance of the factors 
determining the observed differences by answering the following two questions: (i) 
What is the contribution of each of these factors to the differences observed between 
countries? And (ii), what factors and industries offer the highest potential for increasing 
the economic impact of climate finance?  
According to our decomposition analysis, four are the key determinants of the 
impact of climate finance disbursements on a country: the value-added per unit of 
output (or value-added intensity), the level of economic integration between industries 
(or domestic multiplier), the participation in GVC (or foreign multiplier) and the trade 
of final goods with other countries (or trade structure).  
Answering the first question, the relevance of each factor depends on the 
country. The factor productivity (measured as value-added per unit of output) and the 
reliance on imports of final products are especially relevant for explaining why some 
recipient countries retain larger proportions of the impact than others. And in the case of 
donor countries, trade of final goods and participation in GVC explain the main 
differences in their ability to attract spill-overs.  
With regard to the second question, our analysis shows that margins for 
improvement are concentrated in few sectors such as construction, machinery, electrical 
equipment and other business services. The characteristics of the construction sector 
determine the size of the local impact of energy efficiency and adaptation projects 
involving relevant expenditures in this type of services. In particular, differences in the 
value-added intensity of this sector explain why the local impact of such types of 
projects is much larger in some recipient countries than in others. The local impact of 
renewable energy deployment is larger in those recipient countries whose machinery 
industry is well developed and less dependent on imports. Finally, the penetration of 
donors’ machinery and electrical equipment in recipient countries’ markets is one of the 
most important factors determining donors’ ability to attract spill-overs.  
122  
 
5.2.3. Provisions on the use of transferred funds modify the volume of spill-
overs captured by donor countries. 
Finally, considering the prevalence of certain practices by national governments that 
might influence the purchases derived from climate finance disbursements, like tying 
aid and LCR, Chapter 4 deals with the following two research questions: (i) What is the 
effect of tied aid and LCR on the value-added captured by donor countries? And (ii), 
what locations and industries are more sensitive to these practices? 
Regarding the first question, our analysis shows that if aid is tied and recipient 
countries are forced to buy the goods and services required for the implementation of 
climate actions from the donor country, then the spill-overs captured by this donor 
country increase substantially. In particular, spill-overs would increase 8.4 pp on 
average for the donors considered. And if recipient countries impose LCR associated to 
transfers of climate funds, then, donors’ spill-overs would decrease only slightly (less 
than 0.9 pp on average).  
With regard to the second question, the analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that the 
effect of these conditions is especially relevant for those recipient countries that largely 
depend on imported goods to satisfy their final demand. Regarding sectors, the analysis 
shows that spill-overs produced by climate actions where machinery industries play a 
key role (such as the deployment of renewable energy) are highly sensitive to these 
conditions. Thus, for all donors the machinery sector is especially sensitive to the tied 
aid scenario, with spill-overs going from around 1% to close to 10%. LCR have also an 
important (negative) effect on the machinery industry of donor countries, since spill-
overs are reduced to the indirect effect of purchases of intermediate inputs by local 
industries.  
5.3. Policy implications 
Next, we will present the main policy implications that can be drawn from the findings 
of this thesis. In order to do so, we will first focus on those policy recommendations that 
stem from the analysis of the economic impact of climate finance on donors.  
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Results in Chapter 2 confirm that international trade contributes to distribute 
one part of the economic impact of climate finance from the recipient country towards 
other economies, including donor countries. In this sense, climate finance could be seen 
as an instrument to stimulate, indirectly, the economies of donor countries. Furthermore, 
our analysis has shown that, amongst the whole spectrum of climate-related 
interventions, mitigation projects involving the deployment of renewable energy 
sources are those that generate most value-added in donors’ economies (i.e. spill-over 
effects). Also, we have found that each donor would experience different levels of spill-
over effects depending on which country is the recipient. This means that, if spill-overs 
from climate finance were considered in donors’ decisions about how to distribute 
disbursements (something that cannot be tested yet due to the lack of information but 
that would constitute an important area for future research), the current thematic and 
geographic unbalance would be accentuated. This also means that past unbalance is 
consistent with a hypothetical decision framework where donors would choose those 
recipient countries with the highest pay-back in terms of economic spill-overs. 
In any case, given that developed countries see challenging but feasible 
meeting the USD 100 billion per year target by 2020 (as expressed in the mentioned 
roadmap39), we can expect that future North-to-South climate finance flows will 
continue to increase, and with them, the spill-over effects captured by donor countries. 
Findings in Chapter 3 imply that donor countries could improve the extent to which 
they benefit from spill-overs, regardless of where climate finance is disbursed and who 
mobilizes it, by augmenting their competitiveness and participation in GVC of those 
technologies, services and tasks related to climate change mitigation and adaptation.  
Finally, Chapter 4 suggests that spill-overs create an incentive for donors to use 
bilateral channels (that facilitate tying aid), and to concentrate disbursements on 
mitigation actions in countries dependent on international supplies. It also advocates 
that those donor countries with globally competitive industries supplying intermediate 
goods and services along GVC of climate-related goods and services would still attract 
relevant spill-overs without need to tie aid and despite LCR. Besides, LCR would 
diminish the incentive to concentrate finance on mitigation as a way to increase sales of 
                                               
39 UK Government and Australian Government (2016) 
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export-oriented sectors, since spill-overs are rather indirectly captured and also from 
sectors contributing to tackle adaptation needs. 
Results from this study also offer several insights with policy implications for 
recipients of climate finance. Since a major share of the economic impact of climate 
finance disbursements occurs within recipient countries, the foreseeable future flows of 
climate finance would constitute a sizeable impulse for the development of these 
economies. Nevertheless, Chapter 2 shows that the magnitude of this impulse might 
significantly vary. For example, adaptation measures have a larger potential for creating 
local impact than mitigation projects based on renewable energy. Thus, if climate 
change adaptation and development are usually considered as complementary 
objectives, our analysis reinforces this thesis by making visible the short-term economic 
co-benefits of adaptation interventions. According to our results, measures with benefits 
in terms of both adaptation and mitigation are those that create the largest local impacts. 
Hence, this type of interventions results in a win-win outcome, since donor countries 
would benefit from mitigation achievements (given its global good nature) while 
recipient countries would strengthen their resilience and development at the same time. 
Developed countries’ recent announcement of increased funds for adaptation is, hence, 
a good news for recipient countries’ economies (UK Government and Australian 
Government, 2016). 
Developed countries have also recognized that it is more efficient and effective 
to integrate climate action in programmes that generate wider development results. They 
are committed to address the current barriers faced by developing countries to access 
finance by supporting them in the preparation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) consistent with their national 
development plans. Each developing country can request up to USD 3 million to the 
GCF for the formulation of NAPs, and the Paris Committee on Capacity-building will 
start working in 2017 to address needs in capacity building for the implementation of 
NDCs (ibid).  
This means that developing countries have access to resources for the design of 
climate action plans compatible with their development goals, which will make visible 
their financial needs to potential donors. Our findings provide some considerations to 
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bear in mind when designing these plans in order to maximize the potential of finance 
disbursements to impulse the local economy in the short term. In particular, Chapter 3 
identifies three areas of action where governments of developing countries can focus in 
order to exploit the complementarities between climate action and development: 1) to 
specialize in products that are intensive in high technology and skilled labour; 2) to 
increase the integration of the economy, by ensuring good intraregional 
communications and transport networks; and 3) to develop a competitive industrial base 
to reduce their dependence on imports. Finally, governments of these countries could 
maximize the economic co-benefits of climate finance disbursements by concentrating 
their development efforts towards industries related to climate action. Chapter 2 
suggests that technology transfer programmes could also contribute to domestically 
build up competitive industries, multiplying the local impact of climate finance.  
Finally, Chapter 4 suggests that the consolidation of the GCF as the main 
channel for climate finance would benefit recipient countries’ economies by limiting the 
possibilities of including provisions to tie aid, and thus, avoiding larger spill-over 
effects. This consolidation becomes even more essential given the increasing 
importance of new donors40, which have openly adopted the practice of tying aid. An 
additional advantage of the GCF for recipient countries is the guarantee of a balanced 
allocation between mitigation and adaptation. In any case, Chapter 4 suggests that the 
recipient countries could decrease the sensitivity to this practice by decreasing their 
dependence on foreign supplies of final goods. This chapter also shows that spill-overs 
result only slightly affected by LCR. They continue happening through trade of 
intermediate goods, given the increasing relevance of trade in tasks in international 
trade. This means that this type of policies alone would be insufficient to develop 
globally competitive industries. Thus, industrial development policies have to pay 
attention to intermediate goods producers, and focus on the specialization on high 
value-added tasks.   
                                               
40 South-to-South cooperation accounted for an average of USD 8.5 billion in 2013-2014, according to the 
Standing Committee of Finance (UNFCCC, 2016). 
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5.4. Concluding remarks 
This thesis illustrates the relevance of adopting a global approach in the assessment of 
the economic impacts of climate finance disbursements, and provides new insights that 
might help both developed and developing countries to understand the implications of 
decisions about climate finance disbursements. For example, we show that correcting 
the current bias towards mitigation would also benefit recipient countries’ economies, 
and that incentives to maintain this bias are accentuated when donors can tie aid.  
This thesis also contributes with recommendations for the design of national 
strategies promoting the local economy and the fight against climate change at the same 
time. This reinforces the message of the “green economy” literature that climate action 
and economic development are compatible. Thus, we show that the transition towards a 
decarbonized and resilient economy offers opportunities for development and that, in 
order to benefit from these opportunities, countries should direct their development 
towards climate-related industries with high value-added content. This means that the 
search for short-term economic co-benefits of climate finance could result in the 
development of effective solutions for this global environmental problem. 
This thesis also illustrates the potential of GMRIO models for analysing 
worldwide impacts of climate finance, contributing to relevant discussions on the global 
climate regime. This framework captures the consequences of the vertical 
specialization, making visible the role of “trade in tasks” in the distribution of the 
economic gains from climate action.  
5.5. Future research directions 
The work initiated in this thesis could be extended in a number of ways. Here, we detail 
three of the possible directions. 
First, the geographic scope of the assessment could be widened including more 
recipient countries and the new emerging donors. The incorporation of the least 
developed countries would be especially interesting since, with enhanced accessibility 
to finance favoured by capacity building programmes, climate finance disbursements 
might rapidly increase in these countries. Moreover, this would also enable to study the 
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implications of the increasing South-to-South cooperation. However, the use of another 
GMRIO database would be required to that end, since the WIOD does not contain 
information about these countries yet.  
Second, the assessment of climate finance disbursements could be 
complemented with the calculation of emissions embedded in, and avoided by, financed 
climate actions. With this additional input about the net mitigation potential, alternative 
climate actions could be assessed in a multi-criteria framework that would take into 
account both the economic and environmental benefits. Such exercise would identify 
trade-offs between both objectives, as well as win-win options avoiding emissions and 
stimulating the economy at the same time.  
Third, the economic impact generated by climate finance disbursements could 
be divided into labour and capital compensation. The WIOD provides the necessary 
data to make this distinction. It also provides data for the estimation of the job creation 
potential of climate actions, as well as for distinguishing the labour income generated 
for three different skill levels. In this regard, it is necessary to note that while 
employment and wages remain in the country where they are generated, this is not 
necessarily the case of capital compensation. This happens because GVC involve 
sizeable flows of foreign direct investment, and one part of the capital compensation 
generated in one country can accrue to firms headquartered in another country. The 
WIOD does not contain information about the nationality of income, so such extension 
would require additional sources of information about the ownership of capital.  
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